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The Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: Implications
for Greenhouse Gas Trading and Toxic Hotspots
DAVID E. ADELMAN*
This Article presents the first synthesis of geospatial data on toxic air pollution
in the United States. Contrary to conventional views, the data show that vehicles
and small stationary sources emit a majority of the air toxics nationally. Industrial
sources, by contrast, rarely account for more than ten percent of cumulative cancer
risks from all outdoor sources of air toxics. This pattern spans multiple spatial
scales, ranging from census tracts to the nation as a whole. However, it is most
pronounced in metropolitan areas, which have the lowest air quality and are home
to eighty percent of the U.S. population.
The secondary status of industrial facilities as sources of air toxics has
important implications for the current debate over cap-and-trade regulation—the
policy instrument of choice for controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
responsible for climate change. Environmental justice advocates have opposed
GHG trading in significant part because it could exacerbate inequitable exposures
to toxic co-pollutants, not GHGs themselves, in minority and low-income
communities.
The likelihood of such disparities occurring has remained an open empirical
question. The geospatial data reveal that, apart from a few readily identifiable
census tracts, the potential for GHG trading to cause toxic hotspots is extremely
low. Moreover, for the few jurisdictions in which disparities cannot be ruled out,
targeted policies exist to prevent them without compromising market efficiency.
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INTRODUCTION
The potential for cap-and-trade programs1 to cause localized hotspots of toxic
air pollution has long been a flashpoint for opposition to this form of market-based
environmental regulation.2 The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, a
controversial pollution trading system in southern California, was almost upended
due to concerns that environmental-justice advocates raised about toxic hotspots
around major industrial facilities.3 Similarly, the George W. Bush Administration’s
plan to establish a cap-and-trade regime for regulating mercury emissions from
electric utilities was opposed successfully on the grounds that it would allow

1. A pollution-trading regime establishes a numerical cap on aggregate emissions,
allocates emissions credits among sources (for example, an auction) and allows credits to be
traded in a market—hence the term “cap and trade.” Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L.
Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local
and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 575–76 (2001).
2. See, e.g., id. at 580 (noting that academics have “focused almost exclusively on the
possibility that emissions trading will [cause hotspots of air pollutants]”); Lily N. Chinn,
Can the Market Be Fair and Efficient? An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions
Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80, 108–09 (1999); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity:
Do Market-Based Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 111, 111–12 (1999); Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic
Climate Change Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10287, 10287–88 (2008).
3. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn & Shipra
Bansal, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in
Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231, 268–69 (1999) (describing failures of
the RECLAIM program and the deficiencies of market-based regulations generally); Lesley
K. McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”: The Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions
Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 287–312 (2007).
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mercury emissions to concentrate around power plants.4 Even the venerable SO2
trading system for U.S. power plants has not been immune to fears that it could
cause pollution hotspots.5
Despite this record of controversy, cap-and-trade regulation is the policy
instrument of choice for controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions responsible
for climate change.6 Globally, the most prominent regulatory efforts have embraced
it: the European Union’s Emissions Trading System, the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative in the northeastern United States, and, most recently, the landmark Global
Warming Solutions Act in California.7 Policymakers are drawn to the projected
efficiencies of cap-and-trade regimes and to their political virtues—they avoid
taxes and unpopular command-and-control regulations.8 Further, because GHGs are
global pollutants that do not have direct localized impacts, regulatory experts have
considered the risks of hotspots to be essentially zero.9
This benign view of GHG-trading regimes is being challenged by
environmental-justice groups in California and elsewhere.10 In a recent legal action,

4. See Catherine A. O’Neill, Mercury, Risk, and Justice, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11070,
11070–71 (2004) (describing the controversy surrounding the proposed cap-and-trade
regime for mercury emissions from power plants).
5. Jason Corburn, Emissions Trading and Environmental Justice: Distributive
Fairness and the USA’s Acid Rain Programme, 28 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 323, 323–24
(2001); Evan J. Ringquist, Trading Equity for Efficiency in Environmental Protection?:
Environmental Justice Effects from the SO2 Allowance Trading Program, 92 SOC. SCI. Q.
297, 300–01 (2011).
6. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 712–13 (1999) (arguing that global environmental
regulation, particularly for mitigating climate change, should favor pollution trading
regimes); A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW & DAVID HARRISON, JR., EMISSIONS
TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES
1–2, 34 (2003), available at http://www.c2es.org/publications/emissions-trading-usexperience-lessons-and-considerations-greenhouse-gases.
7. Kaswan, supra note 2, at 10291–92; Slobodan Perdan & Adisa Azapagic, Carbon
Trading: Current Schemes and Future Developments, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 6040, 6040–41
(2011). There was the failed attempt by congressional Democrats to pass cap-and-trade
regulations for GHGs in 2009. See William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and
Disappointments: Lessons for Climate Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage
Inertia, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 62–64 (2010).
8. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at v, vi, 29, 34–35 (describing the efficiency
of pollution trading systems); Byron Swift, U.S. Emissions Trading: Myths, Realities, and
Opportunities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2005, at 3, 3–4; Alan Murray, Why Key
Executives Are Warming To Legislation on Climate Change, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at
A10 (describing the support of the business community for cap-and-trade regulation of
GHGs).
9. See ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 40–41; MKT. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL.
AIR RES. BD., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE
SYSTEM
FOR
CALIFORNIA
12
(2007),
available
at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/ARB-1000-2007-007/ARB-1000-2007-007.PDF
(stating that a trading program “[i]n no case” would cause an increase in emissions of toxic copollutants).
10. See Felicity Barringer, California Judge Calls Time Out for Climate Change Law,
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a coalition of groups successfully delayed the decision of the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) to establish a cap-and-trade system for regulating
GHGs.11 One of their primary concerns was the potential for the trading regime to
exacerbate inequitable exposures to toxic co-pollutants, not GHGs themselves, in
minority and low-income communities.12 Simplifying their argument for the
moment, they claimed that the flexibility inherent in a trading regime—the freedom
to surpass regulatory limits by buying tradable credits—could concentrate
emissions of toxic co-pollutants around industrial facilities located in minority
communities.
The validity of this critique follows from the focus of market-based regimes on
aggregate efficiency. Nothing in a pollution-trading regime forecloses inequities in
exposures to toxic co-pollutants, but, as environmental-justice advocates
acknowledge, the likelihood of this occurring is contingent on several factual
predicates. The factors include the relative cost of reducing GHG emissions at
industrial facilities, the geographic distribution of industrial facilities with
significant GHG emissions, correlations between GHG and toxic emissions, and
the relative contribution of major GHG sources to toxic emissions from all sources
collectively.13
This Article will examine whether these factual predicates are likely to exist. I
will focus particular attention on the geographic distribution of industrial facilities
and their relative contributions to toxic emissions. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) maintains, and has been enhancing, several databases on toxic
emissions and cumulative cancer risks that provide an unprecedented level of
information (down to the census tract) and that have not received the attention they
deserve.14 Although subject to important limitations, the databases provide new
insights into the prevalence of hotspots nationally, the geographic concentration of
industrial sources of toxic emissions regionally, and the impacts of diffuse point
and mobile sources on air quality throughout the country.
N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Mar. 22, 2011), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/californiajudge-calls-time-out-for-climate-change-law/; Ngoc Nguyen, Climate-Change Law: Why CA
Environmentalists Are Fighting Each Other, NEW AM. MEDIA (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://newamericamedia.org/2011/03/cap-and-trade-story-here.php. In a subsequent ruling, the
California court allowed implementation of the state’s GHG-trading system to go forward. Bob
Egelko, Cap and Trade Gets Green Light Under State Emissions Law, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8,
2011, at C2.
11. Egelko, supra note 10.
12. Alice Kaswan, Reconciling Justice and Efficiency: Integrating Environmental
Justice into Domestic Cap-and-Trade Programs for Controlling Greenhouse Gases, in THE
ETHICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 232, 240–42 (Denis G. Arnold ed., 2011); Chinn,
supra note 2, at 80–81; Johnson, supra note 2, at 111–12. Note that “co-pollutant” is
typically defined to encompass all emissions of air toxics from a facility, regardless of
whether they are co-emitted with GHGs. I will use this broad definition but will be careful to
note where air toxics are not co-emitted.
13. See TODD SCHATZKI & ROBERT N. STAVINS, ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
CONCERNS IN THE DESIGN OF CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE POLICY 6–14 (2009), available at
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Publishing/Articles/Environmental_Justice.pdf.
14. EPA maintains two databases on toxic emissions, the National Emissions
Inventory and Toxics Release Inventory, and one on cancer risks, the National-Scale Air
Toxics Assessment. See infra Part II for details.
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A few statistics will demonstrate the significance of the findings. Perhaps the
most striking result is that industrial facilities rarely account for more than ten
percent of aggregate toxic emissions from outdoor sources at the county- or censustract level.15 In terms of cancer risks, industrial emissions of air toxics were
associated with at least twenty deaths per million (the national average for all
sources was fifty per million) and accounted for more than thirty percent of the
cumulative cancer risks in 240 census tracts.16 To put this in perspective, cancer
risks from industrial sources exceeded five per million (ten percent of the national
average) in 3792 census tracts out of 65,000 nationally, or six percent of all tracts.17
The data show that mobile sources (for example, cars and trucks) and small point
sources (for example, dry cleaners, gas stations, and landfills) dominate toxic
emissions and risks in most jurisdictions.
EPA data also reveal that industrial sources are clustered in about ten states.
Texas, with its collection of oil refineries and chemical plants, leads this group with
toxic emissions that were more than double those of any other state. The density of
facilities along the Gulf Coast is particularly high—toxic emissions from industries
in Houston alone exceeded those in all but three states. Yet, despite Houston’s
status as the largest industrial hotspot in the country, large stationary sources
collectively accounted for just over a quarter of the toxic emissions and about ten
percent on average of the excess cancer risks from all sources in 2005.
The EPA data expose a seemingly inconsistent pattern typical of air toxic
emissions. Industrial sources of air toxins are geographically concentrated, but even
where their emissions are the highest they rarely dominate. This apparent
incongruity is driven by greater emissions from other sources—air toxins are
largely a product of many small sources, which include stationary and mobile
sources as well as personal and commercial activities. The data reveal that the
common association of toxic air emissions with large industries is inaccurate for
most jurisdictions,18 although important exceptions exist to this general rule.

15. Others, including Congress, have noted the importance of mobile and small
stationary sources in the past. COMM. ON ENV’T & PUB. WORKS, CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1989, S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 187 (1989) (noting “that . . . as much as 75
percent[] of the cancer incidence is attributable to area sources”); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO],CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT
OF
ITS
AIR
TOXICS
PROGRAM
21–22
(2006),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06669.pdf (finding that “small stationary and mobile
sources in total have accounted for more emissions than major stationary sources in every
emissions inventory completed since [1990]”).
16. This statistic covers emissions of Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) carcinogens (about 200 substances) and is limited to census tracts in which the
cumulative excess cancer risk was greater than ten per million.
17. In terms of absolute emissions, there are roughly 2850 facilities nationally that
emit more than 1000 pounds of carcinogens per year (about three pounds per day), and they
are located in about 2250 census tracts.
18. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Migrating Hot Spots,
and the Prospect of Data-Driven Regulation of Complex Industrial Complexes, 86 TEX. L.
REV. 1445, 1445 (2008) (observing that “[u]nlike the criteria pollutants, which come from
‘numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources,’ [air toxics] are associated with particular
industrial activities, like chemical plants and metal smelters” (quoting Clean Air Act §
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These findings appear to be quite robust despite the uncertainties and potential
biases of EPA’s emissions inventories and cancer-risk estimates for air toxics. A
rough bounding analysis of the EPA data suggests that the uncertainties are
significant for a small number of industries and jurisdictions. While this analysis
cannot resolve all of the potential concerns about the EPA data, it provides
benchmarks for the reliability of my conclusions and highlights the empirical
findings for which potential errors cannot be ignored.
The secondary status of industrial facilities as sources of toxic emissions has
particular relevance to concerns about GHG-trading regimes. A simple calculation
illustrates this point: If industrial sources account for roughly ten percent of cancer
risks from air toxics, as they do in many industrialized census tracts in Los
Angeles,19 then a drop of twenty percent in toxic emissions from industrial sources
would cause at most a two percent decline in cumulative cancer risks.20 This tenfold factor limits the potential for inequities to arise at the scale of a census tract or
county. Other factors, both economic and technical, reinforce this limit on
inequities originating from GHG trading by industrial facilities. These findings
suggest that a tradeoff often presumed between efficiency and equity will rarely
exist for GHG-trading regimes in the United States, and that, where inequities are a
potential concern, targeted policies could be adopted to mitigate them without
compromising market efficiency.
It is important to recognize that environmental-justice activists oppose GHGtrading programs for reasons beyond their potential to exacerbate disparities in
exposures to toxic co-pollutants. Among other concerns, they believe that GHGtrading regimes undermine participatory justice,21 impede deployment of
renewables, and are unreliable in practice.22 This Article addresses only one of the
grounds for their opposition, albeit one that has figured prominently in their
advocacy and has had salience with policymakers. Resolving questions about
environmental disparities is thus a critical element of the current debate, but it will
not neutralize activists’ opposition to GHG trading. It could even reinforce their
108(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(B) (2000))).
19. See infra Part IV.A. The average for the Los Angeles air basin is much lower—a
little over two percent of the cancer risk is attributable to point sources. S. COAST AIR
QUALITY MGMT. DIST., MATES III: MULTIPLE AIR TOXICS EXPOSURE STUDY IN THE SOUTH
COAST AIR BASIN 3–10 (2008) [hereinafter MATES III], available at
http://www.aqmd.gov/prdas/matesIII/MATESIIIFinalReportSept2008.html.
20. The targets in California, which are the most aggressive nationally, require GHG
emissions to be reduced to 1990 levels by 2020. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550
(West Supp. 2012). Additionally, California has a soft target (under an Executive Order) of
an eighty percent reduction below 1990 levels by 2050. CAL. AIR RES. BD., FINAL
SUPPLEMENT TO THE AB 32 SCOPING PLAN FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT DOCUMENT 6 (2011),
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/final_supplement_to_sp_fed.pdf.
21. LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISMS AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 13–15 (2001); Alice
Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1045–47 (2003).
22. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, An Essay on Environmental Justice: The Past, The
Present, and Back to the Future, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701, 708–09 (2002); The California
Environmental Justice Movement’s Declaration on Use of Carbon Trading Schemes to
Address Climate Change (2008) [hereinafter EJ Declaration], available at
http://www.environmentalhealth.org/PDFs/CAEJDeclarationonClimateChange.pdf.
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support for a tax on emissions of GHGs,23 which, like all market-based regulations,
is susceptible to causing toxic hotspots.24
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the current debate over
market-based systems and the objections raised by environmental-justice
advocates. To provide the empirical grounding for the debate, Part I then evaluates
the literature on environmental inequities associated with outdoor sources of toxic
air pollutants. Parts II and III present analyses of EPA data on toxic emissions and
cancer risks, respectively, and evaluate geographic patterns at the county, city, and
census-tract levels.25 Part IV analyzes the implications of the EPA data for GHGtrading regimes in California and for the country as a whole.
I. THE CLASH OVER TOXIC HOTSPOTS AND POLLUTION MARKETS
Concerns about disparate impacts on low-income and minority communities
lagged behind the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1960s and
1970s. The failure of environmental policies to address these distributional issues
was first brought to light in the 1980s through a combination of high-profile
grassroots community campaigns and academic studies.26 These efforts grew into
what is now known as the “environmental justice” movement, which promotes
distributional equity and the participation of poor communities of color in
regulatory processes that impact them.27 The political salience of the movement
grew through campaigns against the siting of new industrial facilities that were
modeled on civil rights struggles28 and empirical studies that revealed undesirable
land uses (for example, hazardous waste facilities and industrial plants) were
disproportionately located in poor communities of color.29
One might presume that climate-change policies and environmental-justice
principles would be aligned or, at worst, not overlap. Environmental-justice
advocacy has focused on community-level disparities in environmental quality,

23. See Charles Komanoff, National Environmental Justice Coalition Blasts Cap-andTrade, Backs Carbon Tax, GRIST (June 17, 2008, 3:33 AM), http://grist.org/politics/nojustice-no-cap/.
24. Johnson, supra note 2, at 138 (observing that a tax “on pollution discharges . . .
without regard to the location of the discharge . . . could create toxic hot spots in the same
manner as pollutant trading systems”).
25. Census tracts are small, statistical subdivisions of a county that usually have
between 2500 and 8000 persons, but their spatial sizes vary widely depending on population
density. Census tracts were established to enable statistical comparisons from census to
census. Tracts and Block Numbering Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 19, 2000),
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cen_tract.html.
26. See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 21, at 20–21; CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN JR., THE
PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 13–18 (1998).
27. Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 775, 838–41 (1998).
28. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 21, at 20–21 (describing how the environmental
justice movement applied and extended the methods used by civil rights activists).
29. ROBERT D. BULLARD, PAUL MOHAI, ROBIN SAHA & BEVERLY WRIGHT, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY, 1987-2007, at 2–4 (2007); Gauna, supra note 22, at 702–04.
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which appear distantly related to the global-scale phenomena driving climate
change—it is the globally averaged concentration of GHGs that drives global
warming. Yet, environmental-justice advocates have raised multiple objections to
GHG-pollution-trading regulations,30 ranging from systemic concerns about their
implementation to moral objections about granting rights to pollute.31
This Article addresses just one of these objections—heightened inequities in
exposures to toxic co-pollutants that a GHG-trading program could permit. This
focus is motivated by the prominence of the issue in the public debate over GHGtrading programs, the divisions it has created within the environmental community,
and the salience it has with policymakers.32 The potential for hotspots also
represents a widely recognized shortcoming of market-based environmental
regulations generally,33 and thus the new findings presented in Parts II and III have
implications beyond GHG-trading regimes.
The potential for inequities follows from the market structure of a cap-and-trade
regime. Pollution trading has three basic elements: (1) a cap on aggregate GHG
emissions, (2) a system for allocating emissions quotas to specific facilities, and (3)
a trading market for GHG credits that allows firms to efficiently buy and sell
them.34 Under this regime, firms can choose to meet their emissions allowance (and
not participate in the trading market), aggressively reduce their emissions and sell
excess credits, or exceed their emissions quota and purchase additional credits to
offset the shortfall.35 If the costs of reducing GHG emissions are variable across
different facilities or industries, a pollution-trading system will reduce the cost of
meeting an aggregate-emissions target relative to a regime in which all sources
must meet the same standard. This efficiency gain is achieved by allowing
companies for which reducing GHG emissions is costly to purchase credits
generated by companies with lower emissions-reduction costs.
The simplest, and most likely, scenario for a GHG-trading system to create
inequities would involve major industrial facilities located in low-income and
minority communities choosing to purchase permits over reducing GHG
emissions.36 If emissions of toxic co-pollutants were correlated with GHG
emissions, the flexibility to purchase permits would have the secondary effect of
allowing industrial facilities to emit toxic co-pollutants at their historic levels. At
the same time, other sources would be collectively reducing their GHG emissions

30. See, e.g., J. ANDREW HOERNER & NIA ROBINSON, A CLIMATE OF CHANGE: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, GLOBAL WARMING, AND A JUST CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE U.S. 11, 13 (2008),
available at http://urbanhabitat.org/files/climateofchange-2.pdf; EJ Declaration, supra note
22, at 1–2; Kaswan, supra note 2, at 10287–88.
31. See supra note 30.
32. See Chinn, supra note 2, at 80–81; Kaswan, supra note 12, at 236, 240–42.
33. See supra note 32.
34. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 575–76.
35. Id. at 577.
36. Some commentators have suggested that GHG trading could allow emissions at a
facility to increase. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 2, at 10299–300. As a practical matter this
appears unlikely. A GHG-trading program would be applied on top of existing regulations
and effectively increase the cost of emitting toxic co-pollutants. As discussed below, infra
Part IV.B., this and other factors weigh against such increased emissions at a facility.
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and, assuming a correlation with emissions of toxic co-pollutants, this would cause
a concurrent reduction in their toxic emissions. A GHG-trading regime could
therefore allow emissions of toxic pollutants to remain roughly the same in affected
low-income and minority communities while levels of air toxics would fall
elsewhere. The net effect would be to increase (or create) inequities in toxic
pollution levels experienced by poor communities of color.
A GHG-trading program would not inevitably cause inequitable exposures to air
toxics. The likelihood of this occurring is an empirical question, with the relevant
factors including: (1) the geographic distribution of industrial facilities with large
emissions of GHGs and toxic co-pollutants, (2) the relative cost of reducing GHG
emissions at high-emitting facilities, (3) the correlation between GHG and toxic
emissions at high-emitting facilities, and (4) the contribution of emissions from
such industrial sources to aggregate toxic emissions and cancer risks.37
Information now exists on emissions of air toxics to assess these factual
predicates and to determine whether GHG-pollution-trading regimes could
exacerbate environmental inequities. EPA collects extensive data on toxic
emissions and their cumulative cancer risks by source category (for example, point
sources, non-point sources, and mobile sources)38 and at geographic scales ranging
from the nation as a whole to individual census tracts. These databases are
complemented by the EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory, which is a compilation of
data on toxic emissions from individual industrial sources.
Numerous environmental-justice studies have used the EPA data (or collected
their own) to examine the geographic distribution of industrial facilities and their
local impacts. Three basic types of studies exist: (1) those that focus exclusively on
emissions from industrial sources, (2) those that evaluate emissions from all
categories of outdoor sources (point, non-point, mobile), and (3) those that estimate
cancer risks from all sources of toxic air pollutants, including indoor as well as
outdoor sources.39 Most environmental-justice studies have focused on emissions
from industrial sources only—ignoring contributions from other source categories
altogether.

37. See SCHATZKI & STAVINS, supra note 13, at 6–18.
38. Point sources include large industrial facilities and electric power plants but also
increasingly include many smaller industrial and commercial facilities, such as dry cleaners
and gas stations. Non-point sources (previously “area sources”) include all stationary sources
not treated as “point sources” because their locations cannot be accurately measured at the
facility level (for example, small manufacturers, fireplaces/wood stoves, and prescribed
burns). Mobile sources include on-road vehicles (for example, cars, trucks, and buses) and
nonroad sources (for example, trains, ships, construction equipment, and farm machinery).
Background emissions include natural sources, persistent air toxics (for example, those
originating from a previous year’s emissions), and long-range emissions (for example, those
greater than fifty kilometers). ICF INT’L, AN OVERVIEW OF METHODS FOR EPA’S NATIONALSCALE AIR TOXICS ASSESSMENT 19 (2011) [hereinafter NATA OVERVIEW], available at
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/05pdf/nata_tmd.pdf.
39. Indoor sources are critically important because “most people spend as much as 80
to 90% of their time indoors.” EPA, NATIONAL AIR TOXICS PROGRAM: THE INTEGRATED
URBAN STRATEGY 2-4 (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/urban/natprpt.pdf.
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Potential inequities of GHG-trading programs cannot be evaluated by focusing
solely on industrial sources. The disparities center on elevated risks to public
health,40 which places a premium on more direct measures of risk (for example,
emissions levels and cancer risk estimates) that implicate numerous sources.
Otherwise, disparities that would be trivial relative to aggregate outdoor emissions
of air toxics could appear significant when viewed in isolation. Thus, although
environmental-justice advocates have focused on industrial sources, a full
assessment requires that toxic emissions from all sources be considered and that
emissions from industrial sources be evaluated in relative as well as absolute terms.
Another important shortcoming of existing studies is their failure to consider the
spatial scale over which hotspots of air toxics occur. Typically, questions about
spatial scale are either ignored or set implicitly by the available data, which rarely
have a spatial resolution below the census-tract level.41 Because the spatial scales
are set arbitrarily, the scale of the data for toxic emissions and excess cancer risks
often will not match the spatial scale of the heightened impacts associated with
toxic emissions from specific sources.
Recent studies suggest that the divergence could be substantial between
localized hotspots and geospatial data on toxic emissions and risks. Elevated
impacts of toxic emissions can be limited to a short distance from a point source
but will vary dramatically from as little as several hundred meters to a few
kilometers.42 The most reliable monitoring data are for mobile sources, and they
show that hotspots occur within 0.09 to 0.35 miles of a roadway (a scale much
smaller than a census tract).43 Recognizing this variability, EPA’s demographic
studies default to evaluating impacts at two radii: five and fifty kilometers from a
source.44 EPA has cautioned that, while such an analysis “gives some indication of

40. See Chinn, supra note 2, at 86, 94–95; Drury et al., supra note 3, at 251; Johnson,
supra note 2, at 130–31; Kaswan, supra note 2, at 10293–301.
41. In cities, census tracts typically cover areas of about two square miles; in rural
areas, the spatial averaging of toxic emissions or risks can be over much larger spatial areas
(for example, tens or hundreds of square miles). NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 27–28.
42. Telephone Interview with Ted Palma, Senior Physical Scientist, EPA (Nov. 2,
2011) [hereinafter Palma Interview]; see also Jawad S. Touma, Vlad Isakov, Jason Ching &
Christian Seigneur, Air Quality Modeling of Hazardous Pollutants: Current Status and
Future Directions, 56 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 547, 548 (2006) (observing that “the
maximum impact ranges from a few hundred meters to a few kilometers from [an individual]
source”).
43. See Alex A. Karner, Douglas S. Eisinger & Deb A. Niemeier, Near-Roadway Air
Quality: Synthesizing the Findings from Real-World Data, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 5334,
5341 (2010); Touma et al., supra note 42, at 550 (finding elevated levels of benzene from
roadways at distances “between 200 and 400 m”); Clifford P. Weisel, Benzene Exposure: An
Overview of Monitoring Methods and Their Findings, 184 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL
INTERACTIONS 58, 61 (2010) (finding elevated levels of benzene in homes when located less
than 200 meters from “busy roadways or gasoline stations”); see also Vlad Isakov, John S.
Irwin & Jason Ching, Using CMAQ for Exposure Modeling and Characterizing the Subgrid
Variability for Exposure Estimates, 46 J. APPLIED METEOROLOGY & CLIMATOLOGY 1354,
1362 (2007) (concluding that “modeling at 4 km, and perhaps even at finer grid sizes of the
order of 1 km, cannot accurately characterize ‘hot spots’”).
44. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-
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populations that may be exposed to levels of pollution that cause concern, it does
NOT identify the demographic characteristics of the most highly affected
individuals or communities.”45
Resolving the appropriate scale of analysis for assessing the impacts of toxic
hotspots is challenging in itself, but obtaining the relevant monitoring or modeling
data poses an even greater impediment.
Few studies have attempted to do this systematically, and, to my knowledge, no
studies of environmental disparities currently do so. Thus, while spatial scale is
critically important to assessing inequities, the relationship between the distance
from a source of toxic emissions and its impact on human health is complex and
poorly characterized for most sources. The discussion below of current
environmental-justice studies accepts them on their own terms—in effect, treating
hotspots as defined by the spatial scale of the relevant data.46
In the two subsections that follow, I review the empirical work assessing
disproportionate impacts on low-income and minority communities. The first
subsection analyzes studies on the siting of industrial sources in low-income and
minority communities and the impacts of their toxic emissions. The second
subsection examines studies of disproportionate cancer risks from all sources of air
toxics. The studies cover different types of sources, including indoor sources, to put
industrial emissions of air toxics in context.
A. Empirical Support for the Inequitable Impacts of Industrial Facilities
The empirical work initially focused on the siting of industrial facilities and
hazardous waste sites in low-income and minority neighborhoods.47 This work did
not assess the magnitude of the risks to human health; instead, the authors viewed
the existence of major plants as harmful without attempting to quantify the impacts
on human health. The results, which began to be published in the late 1980s,
garnered significant public and governmental attention and galvanized the
environmental-justice movement into the 1990s.48
The emergence of this empirical work sparked a great deal of controversy
among social scientists and prompted numerous subsequent studies, which
examined associations with other facilities (for example, chemical plants) and
employed a variety of empirical methods.49 The conflicting findings that resulted
from this work provoked several reassessments of the methods and data. Points of
disagreement centered on the geographic scale of analyses, the statistical methods

Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-FuelFired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-CommercialInstitutional Steam Generating Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 24976, 25089 (proposed May 3, 2011)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).
45. Id.
46. I will return to the issue of scale as it pertains to hotspots in Part II.A.2.
47. Evan J. Ringquist, Assessing Evidence of Environmental Inequities: A MetaAnalysis, 24 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 223, 225–26 (2005).
48. COLE & FOSTER, supra note 21, at 20–21, 24–26; Gauna, supra note 22, at 701–03.
49. Ringquist, supra note 47, at 226–28.
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employed, and the types of environmental risks investigated—each of which
researchers argued could have a determinative effect on results.50
Resolving the discrepancies between the studies has been complicated by the
sheer volume of empirical work—there have been almost ninety studies in the
United States alone.51 Attempts at literature reviews, each addressing subsets of the
published studies, have hardly fared better, with divergent findings for and against
the existence of significant environmental inequities.52 From a purely empirical
perspective, the magnitude and, for some social scientists, the existence of
environmental inequities in low-income and minority communities remain hotly
contested.
1. Meta-Analysis of Environmental Justice Studies
A recent empirical study by Evan Ringquist, a political scientist at Indiana
University, attempts to synthesize the existing literature through a meta-analysis of
rigorous empirical studies.53 He limited the meta-analysis to studies of
environmental inequities associated with Superfund sites, industrial facilities with
hazardous emissions, or elevated levels of toxic pollutants. Ringquist started with
thousands of potentially relevant studies, pared this down to 297 studies that met
his methodological and substantive criteria, and ultimately identified forty-nine
acceptable studies.54 Using formal meta-analytic techniques, Ringquist assessed the
statistical significance and estimated the size of the inequities.
Ringquist’s meta-analysis found clear, statistically significant associations
between race and the location of hazardous industrial facilities and elevated
pollution levels, but the results were equivocal for Superfund sites.55 His study also
showed that these results were unaffected by the geographic scale of a study, the

50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 230.
GAO, HAZARDOUS AND NONHAZARDOUS WASTE: DEMOGRAPHICS OF PEOPLE
LIVING NEAR WASTE FACILITIES (1995) (concluding that no reliable evidence exists of
environmental disparities); FOREMAN, supra note 26, at 27 (concluding that empirical
research “must leave room for profound skepticism regarding the reported results” on
environmental disparities); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN, NOT JUST PROSPERITY: ACHIEVING
SUSTAINABILITY WITH ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 9 tbl. 3 (1993) (review of sixty-four studies
finding that the results of sixty-three showed statistically significant environmental
disparities based on income or race); Paul Mohia & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Racism:
Reviewing the Evidence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: TIME
FOR DISCOURSE 163 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (review of twenty-one
studies finding strong support for the inequitable distribution of environmental risks based
on race and income); Jean D. Brendor, Juliana A. Maantay & Jayajit Chakraborty,
Residential Proximity to Environmental Hazards and Adverse Health Outcomes, 101 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S37, S50 (2011) (concluding that “[a]lthough their results are mixed, many
studies found significant relationships between residential proximity to environmental
hazards and adverse health outcomes”).
53. Ringquist, supra note 47, at 223–24.
54. Id. at 230–31.
55. Id. at 232–34.
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type of risk examined, or the type of control variables used.56 Somewhat
surprisingly, he did not find statistically significant associations with low-income
status.57
The statistical results of Ringquist’s meta-analysis bear the claims of
environmental-justice advocates that communities of color are subject to systemic
inequities. However, his analysis runs counter to environmental-justice claims in
one crucial respect—the magnitudes of the inequities. Ringquist’s rough estimate
of the association between race and environmental inequities found that “[b]y most
yardsticks, the magnitude of class- and race-based environmental inequities are
quite modest[,]” but he cautioned that his estimates likely represent a lower bound
for the associations.58 Thus, he finds that the magnitude of disparate risks is
difficult to resolve conclusively, although it is clearly statistically significant.
2. Recent Studies Using Modeled Health-Effects Estimates
Two recent studies not considered by Ringquist, but consistent with his findings,
benefit from new health-effects data released by the EPA. The data are based on the
EPA’s Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) model, which incorporates
data on toxic emissions, chemical toxicity, and local fate and transport of the
pollutants emitted.59 The RSEI model estimates the cancer risks for people living in
neighborhoods around major industrial sources. These studies illustrate the
technical intricacies of attempting to quantify environmental inequities.
The first of the two studies assessed disparities in exposures to air toxics in 329
metropolitan areas in the United States.60 The authors evaluated the pollution
burden from industrial facilities for six racial groups using an ordinal relative-risk
ranking system, which categorized each racial group according to whether it was
the most pollution-burdened group, rank one, through the least, rank six.61 One of
their primary findings was that African Americans and Hispanics were the first or
second most pollution-burdened racial groups in more than half of the metropolitan
areas studied, whereas Whites were the first or second most pollution-burdened
group in only twelve percent of these areas.62

56. Id. The only studies that failed to find statistically significant disparities used an
improper method of selecting comparison communities (for example, neither low-income
nor minority communities). Id. at 227.
57. Id. at 233–34.
58. Id. at 241. This result prompted Ringquist to argue that “promoting environmental
equity, while important, ought to be viewed as one among a series of competing goals that
would include enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness, innovativeness, and responsiveness of
environmental regulation.” Id.
59. EPA, EPA’S RISK-SCREENING ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS (RSEI) METHODOLOGY
1 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/rsei/pubs/rsei_methodology_v2.3.0.pdf.
60. Liam Downey, Summer Dubois, Brian Hawkins & Michelle Walker,
Environmental Inequality in Metropolitan America, 21 ORG. & ENV’T. 270, 270 (2008).
61. The six racial groups were African Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanics,
Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and Whites. Id.
62. Id. at 278. African Americans also experienced greater disparities than other racial
groups. Id. at 279.
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Other results, however, did not reveal a consistent pattern of environmental
inequities. In particular, Whites experienced pollution burdens that were higher
than those of African Americans in twenty-one percent of the metro areas,63 and
increased segregation was correlated with African Americans being the leastburdened group.64 Nor did the study find an association with low-income status.65
The mixed results caused the authors to conclude that “environmental inequality
outcomes vary widely across metropolitan areas” and that each racial group
“experience[s] a heavy pollution burden in many metropolitan areas” from
industrial sources.66
The second study, Justice in the Air, employed a different set of metrics
altogether.67 The authors calculated the share of health risks from industrial
facilities borne by low-income and minority communities.68 These health-risk
quotients were then compared against the low-income and minority proportion of
the relevant population; if they were substantially higher, the authors inferred that
inequities existed. The analysis evaluated disparities at the state and city levels as
well as for specific industries and companies.
The state-level analysis found that the racial and low-income disparities were
typically less than fifteen and five percent, respectively.69 As one would expect for
smaller spatial scales, the disparities were larger for cities. Racial disparities among
the ten cities with the highest inequities were typically less than twenty percent,
which in relative terms equates to average exposures for minorities that are two to
three times those of whites.70 Disparities based on low-income status were typically
less than ten percent, or in relative terms on average about twice those of middleand high-income communities.71 The industry-level data were of similar magnitude
(about five percent), but disparities approached thirty percent for specific facilities
(for example, oil refineries).72 Unfortunately, the authors did not analyze the
disparities statistically, making it impossible to assess the degree to which the
results were a product of systematic disparities as opposed to random variation.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 284–86.
Id.
Id. at 289.
See MICHAEL ASH, JAMES K. BOYCE, GRACE CHANG, MANUEL PASTOR, JUSTIN
SCOGGINS & JENNIFER TRAN, JUSTICE IN THE AIR: TRACKING TOXIC POLLUTION FROM
AMERICAN’S INDUSTRIES AND COMPANIES TO OUR STATES, CITES, AND NEIGHBORHOODS 2–4
(2009), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/justice/. Similar to the other studies, major
industrial facilities included those required to submit annual reports for the Toxic Release
Inventory; health risks included cancer and non-cancer illnesses. Id.
68. Id. at 4–6.
69. Id. at 6–7. Tennessee had the greatest racial disparity at twenty-two percent, and
Illinois had the highest income disparity at seven percent. Id.
70. Id.
71. Midsize cities in the southeast—Birmingham, Baton Rouge, and Memphis—
displayed the highest racial disparities (twenty-two to thirty percent), with minority
exposures in these cities on average about twice those of the White populations. Id. at 8. For
income, Birmingham had the highest disparity (eleven percent). Id.
72. Id. at 12.
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Consistent with Ringquist’s meta-analysis, the RSEI-based studies found
evidence that racial inequities are statistically significant, but the strength of the
associations varied according to the metrics employed and the aggregation of the
data. Some discrete patterns stand out in both studies. In particular, African
Americans had a higher likelihood of being exposed to disparate health risks from
industrial air toxics and for the risks to be greater than those of other groups.
3. Estimating Potential Inequities in GHG-Trading Systems
Minding the Climate Gap73 assesses the potential for the proposed GHG-trading
program in California to affect the geographic distribution of toxic emissions from
industrial facilities. The report focused on industrial facilities with large CO2
emissions and employed distance as a proxy for exposure to simplify their analysis
further.74 Using particulate matter (PM) that is less than ten microns in diameter as
the sole pollutant, exposures were estimated according to whether a census block
fell within a specified radius of a facility. The authors then calculated populationweighted emissions burdens based on demographic data.
The results revealed that disparities varied with the radius of the analysis—
ranging from minor disparities at a half-mile radius to disparities of a factor of
three between African Americans and Whites at a six-mile radius.75 At every
distance, pollution burdens for Whites lagged behind those for minorities. Equally
important, petroleum refineries, which are concentrated in Los Angeles and the San
Francisco Bay area, were found to account for ninety-three percent of the
disparities between Whites and minorities.76
The authors conclude that the potential exists for the operation of a cap-andtrade regime in California to disproportionately impact communities of color.77
They also express particular concern about the limited number of facilities driving
inequities and their geographic localization, as this could heighten the disparities
experienced by neighboring communities.78
The studies described in this subsection address one of the factual predicates—
the citing of industrial sources and impacts of their toxic emissions. The next
section augments this work with information on the relative contributions of
industrial facilities to aggregate emissions of air toxics from all sources.

73. MANUEL PASTOR, RACHEL MORELLO-FROSCH, JAMES SADD & JUSTIN SCOGGINS,
MINDING THE CLIMATE GAP: WHAT’S AT STAKE IF CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE LAW ISN’T DONE
RIGHT AND RIGHT AWAY 5 (2010) [hereinafter Minding the Climate Gap], available at
http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/documents/mindingthegap.pdf.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 16. The authors used a “pollution disparity index,” which “measures the
relative co-pollutant [PM] burden on communities of color, as compared with non-Hispanic
white communities.” Id. at 15. For each facility, this was the average pollution burden for
people of color minus the average pollution burden for non-Hispanic Whites. Id.
76. Id. at 18. The impact of these facilities was increased further because the
background levels of PM in San Francisco and particularly Los Angeles were very high (due
to other sources). Id. at 27–28.
77. Id. at 21–22.
78. Id. at 8–10.
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B. Disparities in Risks from Air Toxics—Indoor and Outdoor Sources
Several studies have been conducted on environmental inequities associated
with outdoor sources of toxic air pollutants individually and collectively. They use
the same basic methods as those that focus solely on emissions from industrial
sources, but the process of inventorying emissions from multiple source categories
is more complex and thus introduces additional sources of uncertainty. This may be
particularly true for estimates of emissions from numerous smaller sources that are
difficult to measure directly and thus rely on crude proxies.79
1. Evidence of Inequities from All Outdoor Sources of Air Toxics
One of the earliest studies was focused on the Los Angeles metropolitan area
and was conducted by several of the investigators who contributed to the Minding
the Climate Gap report.80 The authors found positive correlations between cancer
risks and race that were consistent with or greater than the studies in Part I.A,81 but
their most notable finding was that mobile and non-point sources accounted for
about ninety percent of the cumulative cancer risks.82 Summing up their results, the
authors concluded that “air toxics concentrations and their associated health risks
originate mostly from smaller area and mobile sources.”83
A second study evaluated relative cancer risks (RCRs) for different racial groups
based on the degree of segregation in metropolitan areas.84 The study found that
RCRs increased with the degree of segregation in a community, but the effects
varied by racial group—Hispanics were subject to the most pronounced disparities
and Whites the least.85 The RCR averaged 1.32 (1.28 to 1.36) for minorities
collectively in extremely segregated metro areas and rose to 1.74 (1.61 to 1.88) for
Hispanic communities.86

79. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 27–28 (describing the use of population and
other proxies to apportion emissions from non-point and mobiles sources between census
tracts).
80. Rachel Morello-Frosch, Manuel Pastor Jr., Carlos Porras & James Sadd,
Environmental Justice and Regional Inequality in Southern California: Implications for
Future Research, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 149, 150 (2002).
81. Id. at 151.
82. Id. at 152.
83. Id.
84. Rachel Morello-Frosch & Bill M. Jesdale, Separate and Unequal: Residential
Segregation and Estimated Cancer Risks Associated with Ambient Air Toxics in U.S.
Metropolitan Areas, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 386, 386 (2006) (also based on the 1995
NATA results and 1990 U.S. census data).
85. Id. at 387–88. The authors quantified the degree of segregation using a
“dissimilarity index” (DI), “which is interpreted as the proportion of the racial group of
interest that would need to relocate to another census tract to achieve an even distribution
throughout a metropolitan area.” Id. at 388.
86. Id. at 390–92. Numbers in parentheses represent the ninety-five percent confidence
interval.
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The observed disparities were pervasive because seventy-five percent of U.S.
metropolitan areas were either highly or extremely segregated.87 They were also
significant in absolute terms. In 1990, the average cancer risk from air toxics
nationally was 632 per million, most of which (about eighty percent) was
attributable to mobile-source emissions of diesel PM.88 Point sources accounted for
1.3 percent of the cancer risks (or about eight per million), but the averaging over
multiple metropolitan areas obscured higher industrial contributions in specific
cities.89 For Hispanics, the pollution levels translated to a cancer risk of 1084 per
million in extremely segregated metro areas.90 By comparison, EPA aims to reduce
cancer risks below one per million and views cancer risks above 100 per million to
be clearly unacceptable.91
Subsequent iterations of EPA’s National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment (NATA)
and the resulting improvements in the available data have enabled social scientists
to undertake detailed assessments of source contributions to cumulative cancer
risks. A 2008 study of the Houston metropolitan area is among the leading studies
to evaluate racial and socioeconomic factors using census-tract data on cancer
risks.92 The new data enabled the authors to evaluate variations in cancer risks
across Houston and to correlate these patterns with demographic data.
The skewed nature of the risks was among the most important findings—a small
number of census tracts were subject to about twice the average cancer risk for
Houston residents, which was 676 per million in 1999.93 The authors found
associations between race, income, and educational level for census tracts with the
highest pollution levels.94 For example, census tracts with higher Hispanic
populations were much more likely to be among tracts with the highest cancer
risks.95 Similar to other studies, the disparities were driven largely by emissions
from mobile and non-point sources,96 although cancer risks from industrial sources
were not low in absolute terms (averaging eighty-five per million and ranging as
high as 256 per million).97

87. Id. at 391. The authors use a “multigroup dissimilarity” index (“Dm”), which “is
the minimum number of people who would need to move from one neighborhood to another
so that the distribution of each racial/ethnic group in every neighborhood matches that of the
metropolis as a whole.” Id. at 388. Under the definition, a highly segregated area has a Dm
of 0.40-0.60, and an extremely segregated area has a Dm of greater than 0.60. Id.
88. Id. at 389.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions
from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels,
Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044,
38,045 (Sept. 14, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
92. Stephen H. Linder, Dritana Marko & Ken Sexton, Cumulative Cancer Risk from
Air Pollution in Houston: Disparities in Risk Burden and Social Disadvantage, 42 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 4312, 4318–20 (2008).
93. Id. at 4314.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 4315–17.
97. Id. at 4314. These figures represent the fifth to ninety-fifth percentiles.
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The Houston study is particularly valuable with regard to its findings on the
spatial patterns of emissions from different types of sources. While mobile and
non-point sources accounted for about eighty-five percent of the cancer risks from
air toxics throughout most of the city,98 in several neighborhoods with the highest
pollution levels industrial sources accounted for almost seventy percent of the
cancer risks.99 These findings highlight the geographic variation in cancer risks and
source contributions that can exist in major metropolitan areas.
2. Evidence of Inequities from Outdoor and Indoor Sources of Air Toxics
As part of their efforts to construct comprehensive inventories of toxic
emissions, scientists have sought to quantify risks from indoor as well as outdoor
sources. The Relationships of Indoor, Outdoor, and Personal Air (RIOPA) study is
a leading scientific effort to measure emissions from all sources of air toxics.100 The
research collected data from 1999 to 2001 on three cities (Elizabeth, NJ; Houston,
TX; and Los Angeles, CA) with diverse populations and high levels of emissions
from all source categories. 101
A recent analysis of the RIOPA data compared the cumulative risks and sources
of exposure for Hispanics and Whites in the study. The study found high cancer
risks for both subgroups: median cancer risks of 519 and 443 per million for
Hispanics and Whites, respectively.102 The racial disparities were greatest in
Houston (sixty percent), but the results were truly shocking for the most exposed
cohorts of Hispanic residents, who were subject to a cumulative cancer risk of 3968
per million (versus 751 per million for Whites).103
The principal pollutants driving the cancer risks were from indoor sources,104
and the highest cancer risks were strongly associated with a single chemical (pDCB) used in air fresheners and moth repellents.105 These results were consistent

98. Id. at 4319.
99. Id.
100. CLIFFORD P. WEISEL, JUNFENG (JIM) ZHANG, BARBARA J. TURPIN, MARIA T.
MORANDI, STEVEN COLOME, THOMAS H. STOCK & DALIA M. SPEKTOR, HEALTH EFFECTS
INSTITUTE, RELATIONSHIPS OF INDOOR, OUTDOOR, AND PERSONAL AIR (RIOPA): PART I.
COLLECTION METHODS AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES 1–2 (2005), available at
http://pubs.healtheffects.org/view.php?id=31.
101. Diana E. Hun, Jeffrey A. Siegel, Maria T. Morandi, Thomas H. Stock & Richard
L. Corsi, Cancer Risk Disparities Between Hispanic and Non-Hispanic White Populations:
The Role of Exposure to Indoor Air Pollution, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1925, 1925–26
(2009).
102. Id. at 1925.
103. Id. at 1927–28.
104. Id. at 1927 (collectively formaldehyde, para-dichlorobenzene (p-DCB),
acetaldehyde, chloroform, and benzene accounted for eighty-three percent of the cancer risks
for Hispanics and ninety-two percent for Whites).
105. Id. at 1927–28. p-DCB alone accounted for eighty-eight percent of the mean
cancer risks for the top third of the Hispanic population in Houston and fifty-three percent in
Los Angeles and Elizabeth. Id.
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with cancer risk estimates and the chemicals identified as the primary risk drivers
in other studies.106
Collectively, the available studies on environmental inequities suggest several
broad conclusions. The first is that solid, statistically significant evidence exists for
racial inequities from emissions of air toxics; by contrast, the evidence for
inequities based on income is equivocal. Further, racial inequities have been
demonstrated for stationary sources on their own and for multiple sources
collectively, including outdoor and indoor sources of air toxics.
Estimating the magnitude of racial inequities has proved more challenging and
variable. The estimates range from “quite modest,” according to Ringquist’s formal
statistical analysis of industrial sources,107 to substantial for racial disparities from
all outdoor sources of air toxics.108 Among the studies of industrial sources, Justice
in the Air provides the most direct estimates of inequities, finding racial disparities
from toxic exposures to be as high as thirty-one percent in cities and forty-six
percent around individual industrial facilities.109 These numbers are upper bounds
on risk disparities, as opposed to measures of systematic inequities. They and other
data in Justice in the Air suggest that racial disparities from industrial emissions of
air toxics typically fall below twenty percent and very rarely exceed thirty percent.
One of the clearest results of this work concerns the relative contributions from
different categories of outdoor sources. The studies consistently find that emissions
of air toxics from area and mobile sources are dominant in most jurisdictions,
although, as demonstrated by the Houston study, important exceptions exist. The
findings for outdoor sources are reinforced by the study that includes exposures
from indoor sources of air toxics. Together the studies highlight the importance of
addressing emissions from mobile, non-point, and indoor sources, both with respect
to aggregate cancer risks and disparate impacts on minority groups.
II. U.S. TOXIC EMISSIONS INVENTORIES, CANCER RISKS, AND GEOGRAPHIC
HOTSPOTS
The debate over inequities associated with toxic hotspots, as illustrated by the
studies discussed in the preceding section, has focused largely on national studies
of cancer risks or discrete studies of industrial emissions or cancer risks in specific
jurisdictions. Empirical studies have not attempted to map toxic air emissions

106. Id. at 1929–30. The other studies included Benjamin J. Apelberg, Timothy J.
Buckley & Ronald H. White, Socioeconomic and Racial Disparities in Cancer Risk from Air
Toxics in Maryland, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 693, 697–98 (2005); Jeanetta E. Churchill,
David L. Ashley & Wendy E. Kaye, Recent Chemical Exposures and Blood Volatile
Organic Compound Levels in a Large Population-Based Sample, 56 ARCHIVES ENVTL.
HEALTH 157 (2001); and Jennifer C. D’Souza, Chunrong Jia, Bhrarmar Mukherjee & Stuart
Batterman, Ethnicity, Housing and Personal Factors as Determinants of VOC Exposures, 43
ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 2884 (2009).
107. Ringquist, supra note 47, at 241.
108. Morello-Frosch & Jesdale, supra note 84, at 389–90.
109. ASH ET AL., supra note 67, at 11–12 (finding the minority share of toxic exposures
for the Baton Rouge Refinery was seventy-eight percent, whereas the minority share of the
U.S. population is nearly thirty-two percent, leading to a disparity of forty-six percent).
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systematically or to examine patterns in source-category contributions across the
United States. Yet, this kind of analysis has the potential to provide firmer
empirical support for current debates as well as to reveal the prevalence of toxic
hotspots nationally and the primary sources that are responsible for them.
Moreover, EPA has been releasing increasingly detailed and accessible databases
that make this type of analysis increasingly tractable.
I will provide an overview of air toxics in the United States using data on toxic
emissions levels and cumulative, cancer-risk estimates (see Table 1). The two types
of data provide complementary views of toxic hotspots across the country, as each
metric has its strengths and limitations. Broad trends in emissions of air toxics, for
example, reveal the relative importance of different source categories.
Table 1: EPA Emissions and Cancer Risk Databases for Air Toxics110
Database Name

Metric

Sources Covered

Toxic Release
Inventory

Emissions
(Pounds)

Major point
sources

National Emissions
Inventory

Emissions
(Tons)

All source
categories

National-Scale Air
Toxics Assessment

Cancer Risk (excess
mortality per
million)

All source
categories

Years Compiled
Annually
(1988-2010)
Tri-Annually
(2005, 2002,
1999, 1996)
Tri-Annually
(2005, 2002,
1999, 1996)

Table 2 displays the trends in aggregate emissions of air toxics nationally, which
dropped more than fifty percent between 1993 and 2005,111 and the contributions
from the three primary source categories. While the percentages of emissions from
point sources have declined and those from mobile sources remained flat, the
percentage from non-point sources increased substantially. As a consequence,
industrial sources now account for a small fraction of air-toxics emissions, while
mobile and non-point sources dominate emissions nationally.112

110. The analysis that follows utilizes the data in the three EPA databases: the Toxics Release
Inventory, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridotnet/index.html; the 2005 National Emissions Inventory
Data & Documentation, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/net/2005inventory.html; and the
National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airtoxics/nata2005/tables.html.
111. The declines in emissions of air toxics are paralleled by declines in the levels of air
toxics found in human blood samples, although many of the exposures are from indoor
sources. See, e.g., Feng-Chiao Su, Bhramar Mukherjee & Stuart Batterman, Trends of VOC
Exposure Among a Nationally Representative Sample: Analysis of the NHANES 1988
Through 2004 Data Sets, 45 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 4858, 4866 (2011).
112. The implications of these trends are well recognized. See, e.g., C. Andrew Miller,
George Hidy, Jeremy Hales, Charles E. Kolb, Arthur S. Werner, Bernd Haneke, David
Parrish, H. Christopher Frey, Leonora Rojas-Bracho, Marc Deslauriers, Bill Pennell & J.
David Mobley, Air Emission Inventories in North America: A Critical Assessment, 56 J. AIR
WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 1115, 1115 (2006) (stating that “reductions in the largest emissions
sources” have elevated the importance of smaller sources).
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Table 2: Percentage of Total Air-Toxics Emissions by Source Category

Year

Total 113
Emissions

Mobile
Sources

Non-Point
and Other
Sources

Point
Sources

1993

6.4

51

29

19

1999

4.6

48

34

17

2002

4.1

46

43

12

3.7

48

39

13

114

2005

The data on emissions of air toxics come from two sources, the Toxic Release
Inventory (TRI)115 and the tri-annual National Emissions Inventory (NEI).116 The
TRI data are based on reported emissions from major industrial sources that must
be submitted annually,117 whereas the NEI data encompass emissions from all
outdoor sources of air toxics (for example, large and small stationary sources, onroad and nonroad mobile sources).118 A subset of the data in the TRI and NEI is
derived from direct measurements of toxic air emissions, but because direct
measurement of toxic emissions is difficult, most of the data are based on estimates
derived from algorithms or computer models.119

113. Total emissions are in millions of tons. GAO, supra note 15, at 22. The annual
emissions were altered to remove hydrochloric acid, which is not a carcinogen and had the
second-largest emissions of any chemical in 2005. The method I used almost certainly
overcorrects for emissions of hydrochloric acid in earlier estimates, implying that the relative
drop in emissions from point sources is steeper than these figures suggest.
114. This estimate is based on the 2005 National Emissions Inventory data and
excluded hydrochloric acid, ammonia, carbon dioxide, unknown (as of January 19, 2008),
and all of the criteria pollutants (for example, lead, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur
dioxide, all particulate matter including condensable matter, and volatile organic compounds
(VOCs)).
115. See supra note 110.
116. Id.
117. Basics
of
TRI
Reporting,
EPA
(July
19,
2012),
http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/bussinesscycle/index.html
(the
basic
reporting
requirements apply to certain listed industries as well as to any company with greater than
ten employees that manufactures or processes greater than 25,000 pounds of a TRI-listed
chemicals annually or otherwise uses more than 10,000 pounds of a listed chemical
annually).
118. See 2005 National Emissions Inventory Data & Documentation, supra note 110
(descriptions of data and detailed documentation on the 2005 NEI).
119. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EPA CAN IMPROVE EMISSIONS FACTORS
DEVELOPMENT
AND
MANAGEMENT
2–4
(2006),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060322-2006-P-00017.pdf (noting that “emissions
factors are used for about 80 percent of emissions determinations”); N. AM. RESEARCH
STRATEGY FOR TROPOSPHERIC OZONE, AN ASSESSMENT OF TROPOSPHERIC OZONE POLLUTION: A
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EPA has a program dedicated to promulgating the “emissions factors”
incorporated into the algorithms used to estimate emissions from individual sources
(for example, chemical storage tanks at refineries and kilns at cement plants).120
Notwithstanding EPA’s best efforts, the emissions factors are subject to significant
uncertainties.121 EPA’s ranking of its emissions factors reflects these difficulties—
sixty-two percent of the factors are rated either below average (twenty-eight
percent) or poor (thirty-four percent) according to the quality of the data upon
which they were derived.122 Independent studies have also exposed uncertainties in
EPA’s emissions inventories for mobile sources and non-point sources.123
However, the largest underestimates of emissions have been associated with a
small number of industrial sources,124 most notably petroleum refineries and
ethanol plants; to its credit, EPA has subsequently sought to correct them.125
NORTH
AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE
3-23
(2000),
available
at
ftp://narsto.esd.ornl.gov/pub/Ozone_Assessment/NARSTO_Ozone_Assessment_Complete.pdf
[hereinafter NARSTO] (observing that “[a]fter 20 years of effort, emission estimates continue
to be one of the weakest links in the air-quality management process and a major source of
uncertainty”).
120. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 119, at 24 (observing that “EPA
officials describe the emissions inventory as the foundation for the air program, upon which
everything else is built”).
121. According to one prominent public-private organization, “[d]espite the
improvements that have been made, there remains a great deal of uncertainty in these
estimates” for emissions of VOCs from point sources. NARSTO, supra note 119, at 3-28.
See also Miller et al., supra note 112, at 1120 (stating that “[t]here can be considerable
uncertainty in the data” in part because “many, if not most, source emission estimates are
based on a small number of measurements that [are not representative] of process designs
and operational practices”).
122. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 119, at 8. Further, a majority of
EPA’s emissions factors were developed using ten points of data or less, and none of them
are accompanied by a formal uncertainty estimate. Id. at 17–18.
123. NARSTO, supra note 119, at 3-26 (finding studies “suggested that mobile sources
are responsible for a larger portion of the total VOC emissions than that predicted by
emission inventories”); id. at 3–28 (suggesting that “emissions from stationary area sources
are even more difficult to accurately characterize” as “[d]irect measurement of area source
emissions is hardly ever practical because of technical and cost considerations”). More
recent work by EPA has addressed problems with low emissions estimates for mobile
sources. See Richard Cook, Jawad S. Touma, Antonio Fernandez, David Brzezinski, Chad
Bailey, Carl Scarbro, James Thurman, Madeleine Strum, Darrell Ensley & Richard Baldauf,
Impact of Underestimating the Effects of Cold Temperature on Motor Vehicle Start
Emissions of Air Toxics in the United States, 57 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 1469, 1477–
78 (2007).
124. Studies have suggested that some emissions estimates could be low by more than a
factor of ten. E.g., Memorandum from Brenda Shine to EPA Docket No. EPA-HQ-OAR2003-0146 on Potential Low Bias of Reported VOC Emissions from the Petroleum Refining
Industry 1 (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.greenhoustontx.gov/reports/lowbias.pdf
(discussing studies “indicat[ing] that emissions of VOC from refineries are significantly
higher (ten to twenty times) than amounts estimated using standard techniques”); Alex
Cuclis, Presentation/Paper for National Petrochemicals and Refiners Association, Sweden’s
Approach to Refinery Emission Inventories and Their Influence on the U.S. EPA 3–6, (Oct.
24–25, 2011) (unpublished draft) (on file with Indiana Law Journal) (finding that “over 35
studies performed between 1988 and 2008 show that measured emissions are consistently
considerably higher than reported emissions,” and that model estimates can be low by a
factor of ten).
125. EPA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 119, at 8, 10. Recognizing these
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Quantifying the uncertainties of EPA’s emissions factors and improving their
accuracy is technically challenging and costly.126 EPA’s primary check has
involved benchmarking its emissions inventories against direct measurements of air
toxics.127 In the most recent assessment of the 2005 NEI, EPA compared model
pollutant levels derived from the NEI data against monitored ambient levels of
sixty-eight air toxics.128 The model estimates for several of the most important air
toxics nationally (such as acetaldehyde, benzene, butadiene, formaldehyde, and
naphthalene) were found to be within a factor of two of the ambient levels
measured.129 Other studies also suggest that the uncertainties in EPA’s emissions
inventories largely fall within this range.130 Thus, although significant errors and
uncertainties persist, the data are approaching a level of reliability that experts
would like to attain consistently.131

underestimates, EPA enforcement actions during the mid-2000s reduced “over one million tons of
pollutants for the three industries” (petroleum refineries, wood products, and ethanol production).
Id. at 10. EPA has also taken action at other facilities. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, TONAWANDA COMMUNITY AIR QUALITY STUDY, ES-1 to ES-3, 10-1 to 10-2
(2009), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/air_pdf/tonairfinalrpt.pdf; Press Release, EPA,
EPA and DEC Report Progress at Tonawanda Coke Corporation (July 20, 2011), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/99741C7F3CF58E23852578D3005447FB (reporting
on new commitments imposed on Tonawanda Coke Corp. to reduce toxic emissions by a factor of
ten higher than the emission-inventory estimate).
126. NARSTO, supra note 119, at 3-28 (observing that “it is difficult to quantify this
uncertainty due, in part, to the difficulty of obtaining information on the techniques used in
the development of the estimates”); Miller et al., supra note 112, at 1120–22 (describing the
sources of uncertainty and challenges of overcoming them).
127. Nationally, air toxics are monitored at more than one thousand locations, although
monitors are disproportionately located in urban areas. E. RESEARCH GRP., INC., RESULTS OF
THE 2005 NATA MODEL-TO-MONITOR COMPARISON, FINAL REPORT 1-1, 2-4 (2010),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/05pdf/nata2005_model2monitor.pdf.
128. Id. at 3-1.
129. Id. at 2-6, 3-5. Model estimates were within a factor of two (0.5 to 2.0) of the
measured pollutant levels for forty-four percent of the 5621 annual averages calculated. Id.
at 3-5. Potentially mitigating concerns, an important factor believed to bias model estimates
was background concentrations (for example, pollutants transported long distances), as most
pollutants for which the models underestimated ambient levels did not take them into
account. Id. at 3-20.
130. Touma et al., supra note 42, at 549 (stating that “[m]odel-to-monitor comparisons
showed that the model performed within a factor of two at most sites for inert gases, such as
benzene, but underpredicted for metals”); COMM. ON AIR QUALITY MGMT. IN THE U.S.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 99 (2004)
(indicating that “emissions inventories are generally held to have an uncertainty of about a
factor of two or more, although . . . the uncertainty factor is poorly defined”); Devon C.
Payne-Sturges, Thomas A. Burke, Patrick Breysse, Marie Diener-West & Timothy J.
Buckley, Personal Exposure Meets Risk Assessment: A Comparison of Measured and
Modeled Exposures and Risks in an Urban Community, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 589, 597
(2004) (concluding that “results suggest that for pollutants primarily of ambient origin
[EPA’s model] provides a reasonable (within a factor of 2) central estimate for personal
exposures”).
131. Palma Interview, supra note 42; Interview with Dave Allen, Gertz Regents
Professor of Chem. Eng’g, Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Dec. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Allen
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The second type of data covers cancer risk estimates that EPA generates
triannually under its National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment (NATA).132 Although
the 2005 NATA contains data on noncancer risks, my analysis excludes them
because the estimates are less reliable and because point sources generally account
for a lower percentage of the noncancer risks from air toxics.133 The cancer risk
estimates use the NEI emissions data as an input for the EPA exposure models
(such as the chemical breakdown and transport of air toxics).134 The NATA results
are thus dependent on the accuracy of the NEI data, the EPA exposure models, and
toxicity estimates for each compound.135 The complexity of the analyses that
underlie the NATA cancer risk estimates introduces numerous opportunities for
uncertainty and bias in the results.136 Thus, while the NATA data provide a direct
measure of risk, they must be interpreted cautiously.137
The uncertainties and potential biases in the EPA data vary along two
dimensions—geographic and source category. For intra- and interjurisdictional
comparisons, it is critical to keep in mind that the quality and detail of information
differ significantly depending on the geographic scale of the data (uncertainties are
greater at smaller scales)138 and by jurisdiction.139 EPA cautions against using
NATA results “as a definitive means to pinpoint specific risk values within a
census tract, to characterize or compare risks at local levels such as between
neighborhoods, [or] to characterize or compare risk among states . . . .” 140
Interview]. One should also keep in mind that a single monitor (or even a collection of them)
may not be representative of ambient air toxic levels through a modeled area. Jawad S.
Touma, William M. Cox & Joseph A. Tikvart, Spatial and Temporal Variability of Ambient
Air Toxics Data, 56 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N 1716, 1724 (2006) (stating that “[t]he
spatial variability of HAPs within cities is not consistent enough to assume that
concentrations at one monitoring location are representative of other locations”).
132. The cancer risks are expressed as “typical lifetime excess cancer risk” of, for
example, ten per million. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 70.
133. According to the 2005 NATA, nationally point-source emissions of air toxics
accounted for about 1.5% of respiratory risks from all outdoor sources and 17% of the
neurological risks. EPA’s non-cancer risk data are also much less reliable at the county and
census-tract levels than the cancer risk estimates.
134. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 71–77 (describing the sources of uncertainty
in deriving cumulative risk estimates for air toxics).
135. Id.
136. For example, NATA “might not accurately capture sources that have episodic
emissions (e.g., facilities with short-term deviations in emissions resulting from startups,
shutdowns, malfunctions, and upsets). The models assume emission rates are uniform
throughout the year.” NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 7.
137. EPA cautions that the 1999 NATA cannot be compared with the 2005 NATA due
to methodological differences between them. GAO, supra note 15, at 29–30. The GAO has
noted that NATA “is useful for identifying the relative contribution of emissions from
different sources” but questions its reliability in evaluating program effectiveness. Id. at 29.
138. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 5 (stating that “although results are reported at
the census tract level, average risk estimates are far more uncertain at this level of spatial
resolution than at the county or state level”).
139. Id. at 77 (“EPA suggests exercising caution when using the results of these
assessments, as the overall quality and uncertainty of each assessment vary from location to
location and from pollutant to pollutant.”).
140. Id. at 5. EPA recommends that “[f]or analysis of air toxics in smaller areas, such as
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Similarly, because of the spatial averaging over a census tract (or county),
“individual exposures or risks might differ by as much as a factor of ten in either
direction [i.e., above or below a calculated mean].”141 For cross-source
comparisons, the quality of data for specific source categories (for example, point
versus non-point sources) and for individual sources will also vary.142
EPA asserts that the estimates of relative contributions across source categories
are among the most robust,143 but the uncertainties will be substantial for even the
best, typically more-aggregated, data. The various sources of error are factored into
a rough, bounding analysis described in Appendix A, which finds that, apart from a
small number of jurisdictions, the potential errors would not alter the conclusions
of the analysis that follows. Part IV evaluates the implications of these outlier
jurisdictions for GHG-trading regimes and toxic hotspots nationally.
One final point warrants attention before analyzing the EPA data. I will
emphasize relative, as opposed to absolute, emissions levels and risks. My focus on
relative risks is guided by the concerns raised about the potential inequities of
GHG-trading regimes, which revolve around relative disparities in risk
exposures—emissions levels above those of alternative legal regimes. This should
not be read to imply that high absolute risks from industrial sources can be ignored
merely because they occur in highly polluted areas. Consideration of absolute risk
levels is central to any regulatory policy, and, although a secondary consideration
in the present analysis, it is factored explicitly into my definition of industrial
hotspots. Appendix A discusses issues related to relative risks and metric selection
in greater detail.
A. Industrial-Source Emissions at the Municipal and Neighborhood Levels
In this section, I will evaluate the geographic distribution of large industrial
sources of toxic emissions nationally. The analysis will focus on the following
variables: industry, geographic scale, class of air toxics, and source category. The
first two variables are self-explanatory, but the latter two require some additional
explanation. I will use two conventional classes of air toxics: (1) the class of about
200 hazardous air pollutants identified by the Occupational Science and Health
Administration (OSHA) as known or suspected carcinogens (“OSHA
Carcinogens”);144 and (2) a small class of carcinogens that EPA has identified as
national or regional risk drivers in the 2005 NATA (“NATA Toxics”).145 While the
census blocks or in a suspected ‘hotspot,’ other tools such as site-specific monitoring and
local-scale assessments coupled with refined and localized data should be used.” Id.
141. Id. at 69.
142. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
143. See NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 5 (“EPA uses NATA results to identify
pollutants and industrial source categories of greatest concern, improve understanding of
health risks posed by air toxics, . . . set priorities for improving emission inventories, . . .
[and] enhance targeted risk reduction activities . . . .”).
144. OSHA Carcinogens are Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA) Section 313 listed toxic chemicals that meet OSHA carcinogen standard. See
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Basis of OSHA Carcinogens, EPA (Nov. 2011),
http://www.epa.gov/tri/trichemicals/OSHA/OSHA_carcinogen_table_2011.pdf.
145. The NATA Toxics include the following chemicals: 1,3-butadiene, 1,4-
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class of OSHA Carcinogens is comprehensive, NATA Toxics account for a
majority of the cancer risks nationally; both are important classes, but emissions of
NATA toxics track cancer risks much more closely than emissions of OSHA
Carcinogens.
I will use EPA’s definitions of the four categories of sources (point, non-point,
on-road mobile, and nonroad mobile) with one important qualification.146 The
terms “industrial source” and “point source” will be used interchangeably even
though the point-source category includes smaller manufacturers and can
encompass conventional non-point sources such as gas stations and dry cleaners.147
Treating data on point sources as though they were limited to industrial sources will
cause the putative estimates of emissions and risks from industrial sources to be
conservative by virtue of being overinclusive. A benefit of this approach is that it
operates as a rough offset for potential errors in the NEI data and particularly for
any systematic biases in EPA’s algorithms for emissions estimates.148
1. Toxic Emissions from TRI Sources at the Municipal Level
The geographic concentration of major industrial sources of air toxics was
highest in Texas and Louisiana. In each state, industrial emissions in three
municipalities collectively accounted for about sixty percent of statewide emissions
of OSHA Carcinogens in 2010. Among the other states with large emissions from
industrial sources, Indiana, Illinois, and Alabama were in the middle with their top
three municipalities accounting for about forty-five percent of the state total. In the
remaining six states, the top three municipalities accounted for between twenty-five
and thirty-eight percent of each state’s total. Accordingly, Texas and Louisiana had
both the highest aggregate TRI emissions in 2010 and the most geographically
concentrated distribution of the industrial facilities responsible for them.149
Industrial sources of air toxics are also unevenly distributed across metropolitan
areas. Figure 1 shows that among municipalities with substantial emissions of air
bdichlorobenzene, acetaldehyde, acrylonitrile, benzene, chromium compounds,
formaldehyde, naphthalene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and tetrachloroethylene.
EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR THE 2005 NATIONAL-SCALE ASSESSMENT 3–4 (2011),
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/05pdf/sum_results.pdf [hereinafter EPA, SUMMARY OF
RESULTS]. Studies have shown that these are the primary drivers and contributors of cancer
risks from air toxics. See, e.g., Hun et al., supra note 101, at 1927 (describing one study that
found that the main contributors to cumulative cancer risk were formaldehyde, pdichlorobenzene, acetaldehyde, chloroform, and benzene).
146. See NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 9–10 for EPA’s definitions of each
category.
147. See NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 19.
148. The absence of reporting requirements for short-term releases associated with
facility startup, shutdown, and unanticipated disruptions, some of which can double the
annual emissions of a facility, is a major gap in the NEI data. ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT,
GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW OFF-THE-BOOKS INDUSTRIAL UPSET EMISSIONS CHEAT THE
PUBLIC OUT OF CLEAN AIR 1–3 (2004), http://www.environmentalintegrityproject.org/pdf/
publications/eip_upsets_report_appendixa.pdf; NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 7.
149. Industrial emissions in California, which were much lower, were also
concentrated: forty percent in the Los Angeles metropolitan area and over fifty percent in the
top three metropolitan areas in the state.
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toxics in 2010,150 the top fifty metropolitan areas (out of about 420 nationally)
accounted for more than seventy-five percent of the NATA Toxics emitted,
whereas the bottom sixty percent (about 250 metropolitan areas) accounted for less
than ten percent of the NATA Toxics emitted.151 These results demonstrate that a
relatively small number of municipalities contain major industrial sources of air
toxics and, by implication, that the potential for industrial hotspots of toxic air
pollutants is likely to exist in only a few U.S. cities.152
The aggregate emissions of OSHA Carcinogens from TRI sources drop off
rapidly from the maximum found in Houston, which alone accounted for almost ten
percent of such emissions nationally. Port Arthur, Texas and Lake Charles,
Louisiana are treated separately in Figure 1 below but if aggregated would account
for more than five percent of OSHA Carcinogens emissions from TRI sources in
the United States. Together, the top three municipalities encompass TRI sources
that account for almost twenty percent of U.S. emissions of OSHA Carcinogens.

Figure 1: Top Metropolitan Areas for Air Toxics
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Temporal trends indicate that industrial cities in Texas (Houston and Port
Arthur) and Louisiana (Baton Rouge and New Orleans) will likely continue to have
higher industrial emissions than the rest of the country. Heavily industrialized cities

150. “Substantial” is defined here as emissions of at least 10,000 pounds of NATA
Toxics per year.
151. The results are similar for OSHA Carcinogens. The top fifty metropolitan areas
accounted for more than sixty percent of the OSHA Carcinogens emitted, whereas the
bottom sixty metropolitan areas accounted for less than ten percent.
152. It is important to remember that quantity does not track strictly with risk;
emissions of highly toxic emissions (such as chromium) in relatively small amounts can pose
significant risks. Madeline Strum, Rich Cook, James Thurman, Darrell Ensley, Anne Pope,
Ted Palma, Richard Mason, Harvey Michaels & Stephen Shedd, Projection of Hazardous
Air Pollutant Emissions to Future Years, 366 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 590, 597–98 (2006).
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in other states (such as Los Angeles and Chicago) have achieved emissions
reductions that in absolute terms are now substantially below those in these two
states. Throughout the twenty-three years of TRI data, Houston has consistently
outpaced other cities by a large margin, although its aggregate toxic emissions have
converged toward the levels found in the other cities with high TRI emissions
levels.
The TRI data are remarkable for their consistency across a broad range of
geographic scales. While emissions levels have been consistently dropping in most
jurisdictions for more than two decades, major industrial sources of toxic emissions
remain highly concentrated in a small number of states and localities. TRI
emissions, with a few exceptions (Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California;
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), are found disproportionately in the southeastern states,
with Texas and Louisiana standing out even among the states with the highest
emissions.153 At the municipal level, Houston exists in a category of its own—no
other city in the country comes close to the level of air toxics emitted by its cluster
of industrial sources.
2. Assessing the Available Data on Neighborhood-Scale Hotspots
The EPA emissions inventories and cancer-risk data are limited to spatial scales
of counties or census tracts. Counties typically range in area from tens to more than
one thousand square miles. Census tracts can also vary considerably in size,
particularly in rural areas, but in cities they generally cover areas of about two
square miles.154 For purposes of modeling the movement and concentrations of air
pollutants, obtaining a resolution below one square mile is quite challenging if the
objective is to estimate air pollution levels from all sources across a metropolitan
area.155 However, recent studies of air pollution emanating from highways have
shown that hotspots of air toxics can be localized at spatial scales of several
hundred meters.156
A potential problem with the EPA data is that localized hotspots can be
obscured when the emissions associated with them are averaged over the much
larger areas that census tracts and counties encompass. EPA acknowledges
explicitly that its cancer risk data lack the resolution necessary to detect
neighborhood-scale hotspots, and it notes that cancer risks within a census tract can
vary by a factor of ten.157 The potential therefore exists for many hotspots to exist,
albeit spatially constrained and population limited, that are not captured by the EPA
data. If accurate, the low resolution of the EPA data would present a misleadingly
positive picture of the risks from industrial emissions of air toxics.

153. In 2010, emissions of OSHA Carcinogens from TRI-reporting sources in eleven
states exceeded three percent of emissions from major sources nationally, and all but Ohio
were either located in the southeast or contain a major center for petrochemical facilities.
Industrial emissions of NATA Toxics in Texas were twice those of second-place Louisiana
and more than four times those in most other states.
154. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 27–28.
155. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
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The data available to test this hypothesis are quite limited. The technical
limitations of existing air pollution models and the high costs of operating highresolution monitoring networks are the primary impediments. Some of the best
scientific work on microscale hotspots has been conducted in Corpus Christi,
Texas, which is home to several major petroleum refineries.158 The site is
particularly suitable for detecting microscale hotspots for three reasons: (1) the
petroleum refineries are among the largest in the country, (2) petroleum refining is
among the industrial processes with the highest emissions of air toxics, and (3) the
toxic emissions from mobile and non-point sources in the Corpus Christi area are
relatively low by urban standards.159 The Corpus Christi data are also virtually
unique with respect to the number of monitors around the refineries and the length
of time over which high-quality measurements have been collected.160
The results of this work are encouraging. Overall, the researchers found that the
average annual ambient levels of pollutants such as benzene and 1,3-butadiene,
both major air toxics nationally, were below the target level set by the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) in all but one case.161 Further,
most of the monitors were located either on the fence lines of the facilities or within
a few hundred meters of them, and thus within a radius designed to detect
microscale hotspots.162

158. DAVID ALLEN, CORPUS CHRISTI AIR MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE CAMERA
INSTALLATION AND OPERATION PROJECT: ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD
OCTOBER 1, 2009 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2010, at 21, 26 (2011), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/research/ceer/ccaqp/PDF/COCPReports/20102011/COCP%20Annual%20Rpt%203-24-11.pdf; Interoffice Memorandum from Neeraja
Erraguntla, Toxicology Division, Chief Engineer’s Office, Tex. Council on Envtl. Quality,
Health Effects Review of 2010 Ambient Air Network Monitoring Data in Region 14, Corpus
Christi (Aug. 25, 2011), available at http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/implementati
on/tox/monitoring/evaluation/2010/reg_14_corpus.pdf.
159. See ELENA MCDONALD-BULLER, GARY MCGAUGHEY, YOSUKE KIMURA, DAVID
ALLEN, EDWARD TAI, CHRIS COLVILLE, UARPORN NOPMONGCOL & GREG YARWOOD,
DISPERSION MODELING OF BENZENE AND 1,3-BUTADIENE IN CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS iii
(2010) (reporting that point sources accounted for about fifty percent of benzene emissions
and about thirty percent of 1,3-butadiene emissions in Corpus Christi), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/research/ceer/ccaqp/PDF/NATPReports/2010/dispersion_modeling_r
eport_v25%20(2)_PDF.pdf; Allen Interview, supra note 131.
160. See generally MCDONALD-BULLER ET AL., supra note 159 (describing the
monitoring sites set up by the University of Texas).
161. Id. at iv–ix, x–xiii (finding that average annual ambient levels at all monitors
surrounding the Corpus Christi facilities are now below 1.5 parts per billion by volume (ppbV)
and all but one is below 1 ppbV); AIR POLLUTANT WATCH LIST BOUNDARY SUPPLEMENT
DOCUMENTATION: BENZENE IN GALENA PARK 1, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY (July 2011),
http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/implementation/tox/apwl/gp_boundary.docx (stating
that the “no adverse long-term health effects are expected if the annual average benzene
concentration for an area remains below 1.4 ppbv”); DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT DOCUMENT: 1,36,
TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY
(Aug.
7,
2008),
BUTADIENE
http://tceq.com/assets/public/implementation/tox/dsd/final/butadiene,_1-3-_106-99-0_final.pdf
(stating that the long-term Effects Screening Level (ESL) for 1,3-butadiene is 4.5 ppb).
162. MCDONALD-BULLER ET AL., supra note 159, at ii. The specific sources within the
refineries are also diverse, ranging from large stack emissions to diffuse fugitive emissions
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The direct measurements of ambient levels of air toxics were complemented by
high-resolution modeling studies. This work generated detailed maps of ambient
pollution levels in and around the refineries. They revealed that the spatial extent of
plumes with elevated concentrations of air toxics was small, such that cancer risks
beyond the refinery fence lines had a low probability of exceeding a cancer risk of
ten per million.163 An important limitation on these results is that the time
averaging of the measurements makes them insensitive to short-term spikes in
emissions, which occur when a facility starts up, shuts down, or experiences a
technical malfunction. These events, which are common, can cause large increases
in annual emissions, but the impacts on cumulative risks have not been accurately
assessed.164
These results are obviously not representative of other industrial facilities—
particularly steel mills and foundries—but they do provide a useful benchmark for
whether microscale hotspots are likely to be a significant source of cancer risks
around major sources of air toxics. Refineries are among the largest industrial
facilities in the country and a leading industrial source of air toxics. The modeling
results in Corpus Christi are also consistent with estimates of cancer risks from air
toxics emitted by industrial facilities (including refineries) in California.165
The prevalence of microscale hotspots can also be explored using data on the
emission rates for individual facilities. This approach assumes that microscale
hotspots are unlikely to occur below certain threshold levels of toxic emissions,
which will vary according to the characteristics and location of a facility.166 I will
attempt to account for this variability by selecting conservative thresholds for toxic
emissions at individual facilities. The Corpus Christi refineries provide an initial
benchmark for large sources that are more likely to cause microscale hotspots.
Their emissions individually were 100 to 180 pounds of OSHA Carcinogens per
day (38,000 to 68,000 pounds per year) and 30 to 100 pounds of NATA Toxics per
day.
The number of facilities potentially at risk differs between the two classes of air
toxics. If thresholds of twenty and fifty pounds per day are used for OSHA
Carcinogens (less than half those of the Corpus Christi refineries), the number of
facilities at risk nationally of generating microscale hotspots is 1390 and 750,
respectively. If thresholds of ten and twenty pounds per day are used for NATA
Toxics, the number of facilities at risk is 715 and 550, respectively.167 In California,
the numbers are low in absolute terms: forty-one facilities emit more than twenty
pounds of OSHA Carcinogens per day and thirteen emit more than ten pounds of
NATA Toxics per day.

that emanate from elaborate networks of pipelines and storage tanks. See id. at iii.
163. See id.
164. See generally ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, supra note 148, at 1–3; NATA
OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 7.
165. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
167. These estimates ignore heightened risk from highly toxic compounds, such as
chromium. If facilities with highly toxic emissions, largely steel plants and electric utilities,
are included, the estimates for NATA Toxics rise to 600 and 765 facilities for the ten- and
twenty-pound thresholds, respectively.
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These conservative estimates suggest that a substantial number of facilities
nationally could cause microscale hotspots. However, most of these sources do not
emit significant quantities of GHGs. If sources with significant GHG emissions are
singled out, the number of facilities potentially at risk of causing microscale
hotspots falls dramatically—at the ten- and twenty-pound thresholds for NATA
Toxics, about 350 and 250 facilities nationally.168 Moreover, many of these
facilities are associated with hotspots at the census-tract level and thus would be
covered by the definition of “industrial hotspot” used in Part IV to analyze the
implications of the EPA data for GHG trading programs in California and at the
national level.
The results of existing monitoring data and my largely heuristic assessment of
at-risk facilities are far from definitive. They are nevertheless suggestive that the
limited spatial resolution of the EPA data is unlikely to be a major source of error
for the limited purpose of assessing whether a GHG trading regime is likely to
exacerbate toxic hotspots. More work is clearly needed to help resolve these
uncertainties169 and would be of great value to communities located along the fence
lines of major industrial facilities.
B. NEI Data—Industrial Emissions As a Share of Toxic Air Emissions from All
Outdoor Sources
Up to this point the analysis has focused solely on toxic emissions from major
industrial sources. Yet, emissions from small, non-point sources (gas stations and
dry cleaners) and mobile sources (cars, trucks, and trains) collectively account for
much larger proportions of toxic air emissions nationally (Table 2). Evaluating
industrial emissions of air toxics in isolation ignores these sources and thus cannot
be used to infer the relative impacts of industrial emissions or the significance of
the geographic disparities revealed by the TRI data.
When non-point and mobile sources are taken into account, the geographic
variation in toxic emissions, which in this section includes particulate matter (PM),
shifts dramatically. Perhaps most significantly, the Houston area is no longer an
outlier. The emissions of air toxics in several major metropolitan areas, many in
California, are comparable to or exceed those in Houston, including Los Angeles,
Chicago, New York, and the San Francisco Bay Area (see Figures 2 & 3). One
important limitation of the NEI is that it does not include census-tract-level data,
which is significant because the geographic areas encompassed can vary
considerably—tens to thousands of square miles—from county to county.

168. NATA Toxics are the appropriate metric because a relatively small number of air
toxics (for example benzene, formaldehyde, and 1,3-butadiene) are emitted in significant
quantities by the combustion processes that drive GHG emissions at industrial facilities.
169. Although not focused on industrial sources, EPA has launched an initiative to
obtain representative data on hotspots around highways. See Karner et al., supra note 43, at
5534 (“[EPA]’s 2001 Mobile Source Air Toxics (MSAT) Rule identified locations near
heavily trafficked roads as important microenvironments for MSAT exposure.”); Allen
Interview, supra note 131.
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Figures 2 and 3 present a representative collection of counties with some of the
highest aggregate emissions of air toxics.170 They reveal that the highest levels of
toxic emissions from all outdoor sources are concentrated in a small number of
metropolitan areas and that the patterns for cumulative emissions of air toxics differ
substantially from those for industrial sources alone. Data on emissions from
specific industries, which are provided in Appendix B, further bear out these
findings.

Figure 2: Counties with the Highest Emissions of NATA Toxics
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170. This is not a strictly ordered listing of the counties with the highest emissions. If
limited to the counties with the highest emissions, the figures would have more counties in
southern California and Texas.
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Figure 3: Counties with the Highest Emissions of PM2.5
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As mentioned above, the variable geographic sizes and population densities of
these counties complicate analysis of the data. To put this in perspective, New York
County encompasses a mere twenty-three square miles but has a population of 1.6
million, which equates to 71,000 people per square mile. Toward the other end of
the spectrum, Harris County (the county in which Houston is located) encompasses
1729 square miles and has a population of 4.1 million, which equates to 2367
people per square mile. Despite this enormous variability, metropolitan areas with
the highest emissions of NATA Toxics are generally the jurisdictions with the
highest cancer risks, but total population and population densities are critically
important factors as well.171
Appendix B also provides data on emissions of criteria pollutants, including
NOx and SO2, by industrial sector. The 2005 NEI data show that emissions from
major industrial sources varied markedly across the jurisdictions with the highest
emissions from point sources. Emissions from electric utilities, which are of
particular significance given their status as the largest industrial source of GHGs,172
were a minor point source of NATA Toxics and contributed modestly to NOx
emissions,173 but they dominated point-source emissions of PM and SO2 in a

171. This correlation might be expected given EPA’s use of population as a proxy for
apportioning emissions between census tracts from mobile and non-point sources. See
NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 73 (describing population as one of the surrogates used
in allocating emissions).
172. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990 – 2009, at
ES-15 (2011) (showing that electric utilities, largely coal- and natural gas-fired facilities,
generated thirty-three percent of U.S. GHG emissions in 2009).
173. Utility emissions averaged twenty-nine percent for the ten states with the highest
point-source emissions of NOx; the variation ranged from a low of eleven percent in Texas to
a high of fifty-five percent in West Virginia (driven in part by the low, in relative terms, total
emissions of NOx in the state). By contrast, electric utilities accounted for one percent of
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number of states and counties. As a share of total emissions in states with the
highest emissions, utilities dominated SO2 emissions but represented about one
tenth of the total emissions of PM (in California the fraction was less than one
percent).174 Thus, while electric utilities were an important source of PM, the NEI
data suggest that their localized (as opposed to regional) impacts dominate a small
number of counties and states nationally. Utility emissions of NOx, and particularly
SO2, were substantial, but their ambient levels (as well as those of PM) are
regulated separately through the criteria pollutant program under Title I of the
Clean Air Act (CAA).175
The NEI data are perhaps most valuable for what they reveal about the relative
contributions of the four different source categories. Among the counties with the
highest NATA Toxics emissions, industrial sources were almost always minor
contributors to toxic emissions. Harris County, Texas stands out as the only county
with high emissions of NATA Toxics in which the contributions from all four
source categories were comparable (Figure 2). Industrial sources accounted for
more than fifty percent of NATA Toxics emissions in just three counties with
substantial emissions (i.e., about 420 counties with annual emissions above 500
tons per year),176 and, on average, point sources accounted for just five percent of
the NATA Toxics emitted in this cohort of counties.
Consistent with the studies described in Part I, non-point and mobile sources
accounted for a majority of air toxics emissions in most jurisdictions. In assessing
these results, one must consider the inaccuracies in the NEI emissions data and
variation in data quality between jurisdictions and source categories. The low
contributions of stationary sources in most jurisdictions suggest that, absent truly
extraordinary errors, the inaccuracies in EPA’s emissions estimates would not
overcome the predominance of mobile and non-point sources of toxic emissions
found throughout most of the country.

NOx emissions in California.
174. On average, electric utilities accounted for seventy-nine percent of SO2 emissions
among the ten states with the highest emissions nationally in 2005. Among the ten states
with the highest emissions from point sources of PM, electric utilities accounted on average
for eleven percent of PM emissions (in Pennsylvania and Ohio, electric utilities accounted
for sixteen and nineteen percent, respectively). While the variation at the county level was
greater, emissions of PM from electric utilities in just three counties (Indiana, Pennsylvania;
Jefferson, Ohio; and Titus, Texas) accounted for a majority of local PM emissions and
exceeded 5000 tons per year.
175. See generally HOLLY DOREMUS, ALBERT C. LIN, RONALD H. ROSENBERG &
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS
611–17 (5th ed., 2008) (describing the rigorous CAA framework for regulating criteria
pollutants).
176. The three counties were Palm Beach County, Florida (fifty-two percent point;
3849 tons per year); Weld County, Colorado (seventy-six percent point; 1898 tons per year);
and Sweetwater County, Wyoming (seventy percent point; 543 tons per year). By contrast,
total outdoor emissions of NATA Toxics in Harris County (Houston) and Los Angeles
County were, respectively, 5488 and 12,374 tons per year.
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III. RISK ESTIMATES FOR TOXIC AIR EMISSIONS: GEOGRAPHIC SCALE, DENSITY,
AND POPULATION
Studies of cumulative cancer risks from air toxics remain relatively rare in the
United States. The first major studies based on reasonably comprehensive data did
not emerge until the early 2000s, and most rely on EPA data and estimates of
chemical toxicity. Using emissions data from 1990, a group of EPA scientists
published a study showing that about three-quarters of the cancer risk from air
toxics was attributable to just five types of compounds.177 Consistent with other
studies, they also calculated that the median cumulative cancer risk from air toxics
in the United States was about 200 per million in 1990.178
A second major study focused on cancer risks from a select group of high-risk
chemicals and evaluated the relative impacts of indoor and outdoor sources of air
toxics.179 Using more recent 1999 emissions data, the study found that thirty-five
percent of the cumulative cancer risk from air toxics derived from indoor sources,
fifty percent from outdoor sources (both stationary and mobile), and fifteen percent
from exposures through food.180 It also found that five air toxics accounted for
seventy to eighty percent of the cumulative risks from air toxics,181 which
nationally averaged 600 per million (see Figure 4).182 Together, these studies
revealed the importance of a small number of air toxics to cumulative cancer risk,
the high levels of risk at stake, and the importance of indoor as well as outdoor
sources.

177. Tracey J. Woodruff, Jane Caldwell, Vincent J. Cogliano & Daniel A. Axelrad,
Estimating Cancer Risk from Outdoor Concentrations of Hazardous Air Pollutants in 1990,
82 ENVTL. RES. 194, 194 (2000). The specific compounds were polycyclic organic matter
(forty percent), 1,3-butadiene (seventeen percent), formaldehyde (eight percent), benzene
(seven percent), and chromium compounds (seven percent). Id. at 201.
178. Id.
179. Miranda M. Loh, Jonathan I. Levy, John D. Spengler, E. Andres Houseman &
Deborah H. Bennett, Ranking Cancer Risks of Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants in the
United States, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1160, 1164–65 (2007) (the study focused on a
subset of air toxics from the Woodruff study that accounted for more than eighty-seven
percent of the cumulative cancer risk).
180. Id. at 1164 (showing most of the contaminants in food were attributable to outdoor
sources). Consistent with the Woodruff work, Loh et al. found that the dominant outdoor air
toxics included acetaldehyde, butadiene, benzene, and PAHs. Id. These chemicals were also
identified as risk drivers in the two environmental inequity studies described in Part I. See
supra Part I.B.
181. Loh et al., supra note 179, at 1164–65. Note that the California risk estimates are
based on the California Office of Environmental Health and Hazard Assessment (OEHHA),
but the EPA numbers were taken from the Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS). Id. at
1160.
182. The cumulative cancer risk estimate based on the California potencies, 600 per
million, was within an order of magnitude of the value calculated by Woodruff. See id. The
cumulative cancer risk using EPA’s potencies, 1000 per million, was dramatically higher,
but this difference is largely attributable to EPA’s higher estimated risk for dioxin in food,
which was not considered in the other studies. See id. at 1164.
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Figure 4: Mean Cancer Risk Estimates for Chemicals of Greatest Concern183

This work represented a major advance over studies based on emissions alone,
but estimates of cancer risks entail numerous simplifying assumptions and require
the use of complex exposure models.184 Each of these elements of the analysis
introduces potential sources of error and uncertainty that are exceedingly difficult
to quantify rigorously. In EPA’s description of the NATA, the Agency cautions
against overinterpreting data.185 The analysis that follows adopts this cautious
approach when reviewing existing studies and analyzing the results of the 2005
NATA. I will attempt to be especially careful when relying on census-tract data,
which are subject to the largest uncertainties.
A. Results of the 2005 National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment
Most of the existing studies use data from the 1990s, which, given the
significant declines in toxic emissions during the intervening years, dates their risk
estimates. In March of 2011, EPA issued updated risk estimates for air toxics as
part of its 2005 NATA.186 The new data—which do not include cancer risks from
PM—showed that the average cumulative cancer risk from air toxics in 2005 had

183. Loh et al., supra note 179, at 1164 fig. 3 (reprinted with permission).
184. See NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 71–77; see also supra notes 128–130 and
accompanying text.
185. EPA specifically warns users of the data against making interjurisdictional
comparisons of cumulative risks because the certainty and quality of data available can vary
considerably by jurisdiction. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 77.
186. See generally EPA, NATIONAL-SCALE AIR TOXICS ASSESSMENT FOR 2005 FACT
SHEET, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/nata2005/05pdf/nata2005_factsheet.pdf (discussing the
release of the 2005 NATA and differences from past NATAs). The 2005 NATA examined
177 air toxics plus diesel PM and evaluated the cancer and noncancer risks from inhalation
of 139 of those air toxics. EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS, supra note 145, at 1.

2013]

THE COLLECTIVE ORIGINS OF TOXIC AIR POLLUTION

309

dropped to fifty per million.187 This result still left 285 million people exposed to
toxic emissions with cancer risks above ten per million and 13.8 million exposed to
cancer risks above 100 per million.188 Thus, despite significant declines in
emissions between 1990 and 2005, cancer risks for most Americans from air toxics
exceeded the Clean Air Act’s target risk level of one excess death per million.189
Figure 5: Map of 2005 NATA Cumulative Cancer Risks by County190

The 2005 NATA identified specific toxic chemicals of “regional”191 and
“national”192 importance. EPA’s analysis designated formaldehyde as a national
cancer risk driver and several regional cancer risk drivers, including benzene,
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and naphthalene.193 It also identified several

187. EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS, supra note 145, at 4–5.
188. Id.
189. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2) (2006).
190. EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS, supra note 145, at 6.
191. A “regional cancer driver” is defined as either a risk of greater than ten per million
affecting a population of at least one million people or a risk of greater than 100 per million
affecting a population of at least ten thousand people. See id. at 3. A “regional noncancer
driver” is defined as a risk of greater than one per million affecting a population of at least
ten thousand people. See id.
192. A “national cancer driver” is defined as a risk of greater than ten per million
(noncancer one per million) affecting a population of at least twenty-five million people. Id.
193. Id. The 2005 NATA also identified “noncancer” hazard drivers, which included
acrolein nationally and several regional noncancer hazard drivers (such as diesel PM and
chlorine). Id.
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weaker national cancer risk “contributors,”194 which included 1,3-butadiene,
chromium, acetaldehyde, acrylonitrile, and 1,4-dichlorobenzene.195 Overall, despite
several shifts in their relative significance, the same collection of chemicals found
to dominate cancer risks in earlier studies were again singled out in the 2005
NATA.
The census-tract data generated by the 2005 NATA is a significant advance over
earlier assessments notwithstanding the higher uncertainties that come with higher
spatial resolution.196 The added detail confirms the variation in cancer risks from
air toxics across the country and exposes the strong association of urban areas with
the highest cancer risks (see Figure 5).197 They also exhibit the pattern described
earlier of non-point and mobile sources accounting for a majority of the cancer
risks from air toxics in most jurisdictions.
The 2005 NATA results are striking at multiple levels. Focusing first on
industrial sources, one can evaluate the counties and census tracts with the highest
absolute cancer risks attributable to industrial facilities (see Figure 6). At the
county level, the data show that with very few exceptions—just twelve counties—
cancer risks from industrial sources rarely exceeded ten per million. Further, in
counties subject to the highest cumulative cancer risks (greater than fifty per
million), industrial sources accounted for a small percentage of the cancer risks.
The four outliers in Figure 7 are each attributable to emissions from steel foundries
and mills. This pattern holds in large industrial centers such as Houston (Harris
County), in which industrial sources accounted for about ten percent of the cancer
risks. By contrast, the counties with the highest risks from industrial sources alone
were rural or encompassed small cities.

194. EPA defined a “national risk contributor” as a chemical with an excess cancer risk
greater than one per million with an exposed population of at least twenty-five million. Id.
195. Id.
196. See NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 5.
197. These results are reinforced by recent studies based on direct air-quality
monitoring data of specific air toxics. See, e.g., Michael C. McCarthy, Theresa E. O’Brien,
Jessica G. Charrier & Hilary R. Hafner, Characterization of the Chronic Risk and Hazard of
Hazardous Air Pollutants in the United States Using Ambient Monitoring Data, 117 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. 790, 790 (2009).
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Figure 6: Counties with the Highest Point-Source Cancer Risks
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Figure 7: Counties with the Highest Total Cancer Risks
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One could reasonably object that averaging emissions at the county level
obscures toxic hotspots that occur at smaller spatial scales. Moreover, the
importance of this concern is heightened by the variability in the sizes of counties
across the country. The census-tract data could thus be more informative and
consistent with conventional views about the relative importance of industrial
sources to cumulative cancer risks from air toxics.
The census-tract estimates in the 2005 NATA do not bear out this intuition.
Among the 100 census tracts with the highest cancer risks from industrial sources,
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most were located in small cities or rural counties in states such as Alabama, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania, which, consistent with the county-level data, were dominated by
toxic emissions from steel mills and foundries.
Table 3: Census Tracts in Which Cancer Risks from Industrial Emissions of Air
Toxics Exceed Ten per Million

Min

Percent Point
Sources
5.19

Percent Mobile
Sources
0.49

Percent Secondary
Sources
6.24

First Quartile

17.18

9.43

24.13

Second
Quartile

22.36

15.40

29.41

Third
Quartile

30.06

25.36

33.96

Max

87.48

66.09

54.39

The impact of industrial-source emissions on air toxics can also be viewed in
terms of their absolute risks. Toxic emissions from industrial facilities in
approximately 1180 census tracts, about two percent of tracts nationally, produced
cancer risks above ten per million. Of these census tracts, point sources caused
cancer risks above twenty per million in 314 tracts and above fifty per million (the
national average for all sources) in eighty tracts; the overall average was twenty per
million. In relative terms, industrial sources accounted for more than fifty percent
of the cumulative risks from all outdoor sources of air toxics in just sixty-five tracts
and for more than thirty percent in 297 tracts (see Table 3). To put these numbers in
perspective, cancer risks from industrial sources exceeded five per million in 3792
census tracts and one per million (EPA’s target risk level) in 23,705 tracts—or
about a third of the 65,000 census tracts nationally.
Alternatively, one can evaluate the relative contribution to cancer risks from
industrial sources in the census tracts with the highest cumulative risks from all
outdoor sources of air toxics. Cumulative cancer risks exceeded 100 per million in
3100 census tracts nationally (see Table 4). A disproportionate share of these
census tracts were located in the Los Angeles or New York metropolitan areas,198
which highlights the strong correlation between heightened risks from air toxics
and intense urbanization.
Among the census tracts with the highest cumulative cancer risks, industrial
sources were typically a minor factor in relative terms. For about three-quarters of
the tracts, industrial emissions accounted for less than three percent of the
cumulative cancer risk (see Table 4). These numbers are dramatically lower than
most people might predict, and they challenge conventional beliefs about industrial

198. Of the thousand census tracts with the highest cancer risks, 557 are located in the
Los Angeles and 342 are in the New York metropolitan areas; together the two cities
encompass ninety percent of the top thousand tracts.

2013]

THE COLLECTIVE ORIGINS OF TOXIC AIR POLLUTION

313

emissions of air toxics and their association with cancer risks in the vast majority of
U.S. jurisdictions. They also highlight the degree to which the highest cancer risks
from air toxics are largely attributable to mobile and non-point sources.
Table 4: Census Tracts in Which Cumulative Cancer Risks from All Outdoor
Sources of Air Toxics Exceed 100 per Million

Percent Point
Sources

Percent Mobile
Sources

Min

0.09

6.24

Percent
Secondary
Sources
0.81

First Quartile

1.42

22.44

31.43

Second
Quartile

2.01

27.98

36.48

Third
Quartile

3.14

33.69

42.14

Max

87.48

56.96

74.70

These results must be interpreted cautiously for three primary reasons. First, the
spread in cancer risks over the top one thousand census tracts was small in relative
terms—a little more than a factor of two.199 Yet, an ordinal ranking of census tracts
obscures this trend. Second, the significance of these differences is diminished
further by the uncertainties in the cancer risk estimates—uncertainties in the data
are also about a factor of two.200 Ultimately, this is of secondary importance
because the differences in cancer risks between jurisdictions are far less important
than the relative contributions of each source category within them. Third, the
cancer risk estimates do not include diesel PM,201 which is generated largely by
mobile sources and is a major, and often the largest, source of cancer risks in urban
areas.202
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the 2005 NATA estimates of cancer risk
reinforce the evidence showing that mobile and non-point sources are the primary
contributors in most counties and census tracts. This pattern should not obscure the
fact that the absolute levels of cancer risks associated with industrial sources can be
very high on their own—for the most severely impacted areas, cancer risks
substantially higher than twenty per million. Industrial sources of air toxics
therefore cannot be overlooked if EPA and the states are to succeed in reducing

199. This fact is reflected in the risk levels for the top-ranked tracts: No. 1—cancer risk
of 2.88 x 10-4; No. 27—cancer risk of 2.00 x 10-4; No. 500—cancer risk of 1.48 x 10-4; and
No. 1000—cancer risk of 1.27 x 10-4.
200. NATA OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 71–77.
201. EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS, supra note 145, at 1.
202. Morello-Frosch & Jesdale, supra note 84, at 389; see also MATES III, supra note
19, at ES-2 to ES-3.
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cancer risks below the Agency’s regulatory target for cancer risks of one per
million.203
B. The Urban-Rural Divide in Risks from Air Toxics
The highest risks from air toxics are largely an urban phenomenon. The largest
cities in the country—Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Houston—each
encompass numerous census tracts and counties with the highest cancer risks. It
was surprising to me that levels of air toxics in Houston are comparable to those of
other large cities even though Houston is the fourth largest city by population and
has the largest concentration of industrial facilities nationally.204 While the relative
importance of emissions from other sources partially explains why Houston is not
more of an outlier with respect to cancer risks, it is not the only factor.
It goes without saying that major metropolitan areas in the United States vary
greatly in geographic area and total population. The importance of these factors is
most pronounced in the New York City area, which does not initially appear to
have especially high emissions of air toxics. Table 4 below provides basic
information on the geographic size of several counties and their population
densities.205 These statistics suggest that density is a critical factor and that it is the
primary factor (along with total population) driving poor air quality in the New
York City area.206
The 2005 NATA estimates and population data suggest that, once an urban area
reaches a sufficient size or density, the number of mobile and non-point sources of
air toxics become the primary threats to air quality.207 The geographically compact
New York City area, with a population of about 8.18 million in 2010, is an extreme
case along both of these dimensions. The same factors drive toxic air pollution in
Chicago (Cook County), though to a lesser extent. The significance of these
associations is heightened by the fact that about seventy-five percent of air toxics
emissions from all sources nationally occur within urban areas.208

203. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2) (2006).
204. Emissions from industrial sources, in relative or absolute terms, do not place
Harris County in the top ten nationally nor was it among the top ten counties based on
cumulative cancer risks. Harris County is number forty-three and Jefferson County (Port
Arthur) was number twenty-five according to the 2005 NATA estimates of cumulative
cancer risks.
205. This variability is much less for U.S. census tracts (especially in urban areas). See
Decennial
Management
Division
Glossary,
CENSUS.GOV,
http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/glossary.html#C (explaining that a census tract can vary from
1000 to 8000 people but is optimally 4000 people).
206. EPA, supra note 39, at 1-2 (“The urban environment is very unique since the
combination of high population densities and large concentrations of commercial activity
provide the conditions conducive to high exposures and health risks as a result of the
emissions of air toxics.”).
207. This is consistent with EPA’s association of elevated toxic emissions with “[t]he
concentration of activities [that] leads to the presence of multiple emission sources and
proportionately higher emissions of multiple [air toxics].” National Air Toxics Program: The
Integrated Urban Strategy, Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 38706, 38711–12 (July 19, 1999).
208. Id.
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Table 5: County Geographic Scales and Population Densities

New York, NY

Geographic Size
(miles2)
23

Population Density
(people/mile2)
70,951

Los Angeles, CA

4,000

2,066

Cook, IL

946

5,491

Harris, TX

1,729

2,367

County

The drivers of elevated risks from air toxics nevertheless vary between major
urban centers. Los Angeles, for example, does not have an exceptionally high
population density. It appears instead that the large geographic scale of the Los
Angeles metropolitan area is offset by the meteorological problems created by the
mountains to the east of the city (severe temperature inversions can trap air
pollution over the city for extended periods of time) and the aggregate
population—about thirteen million people in 2010.209
The conditions in Houston lie somewhere between those found in New York
and Los Angeles. Houston lacks the population density of New York and the total
population of Los Angeles, as well as the latter’s more severe meteorological
events.210 Geography and population together mitigate the impacts of air toxics
emissions in Houston and apparently trump its status as the city with the largest
concentration of industrial sources nationally. Put differently, once a metropolitan
area exceeds a mid-level size and density, emissions of air toxics from industrial
sources are overwhelmed by those from mobile and nonpoint sources—when
averaged over the spatial scale of a census tract or county.211
The converse also appears to be true. Namely, that where major industrial
sources of air toxics are located in rural or smaller urban areas, they are more likely
to drive cumulative cancer risks. This inference is consistent with Houston having a
single census tract (ranked thirteenth) among those with the highest absolute level
of risk from air toxics emitted by industrial sources, and only one among the top

209. See generally James M. Lents & William J. Kelly, Clearing the Air in Los Angeles,
SCI. AM., Oct. 1993, at 32, 33 (describing the phenomena of temperature inversions and the
impacts on air quality in Los Angeles).
210. While the population density of Houston is close to that of Los Angeles, its
aggregate population in 2010 was only about 5.95 million. Similarly, although not as severe
as the inversions in Los Angeles, stationary air conditions in Houston can trap pollutants
over the city for extended periods of time. See R.M. Banta, C.J. Senff, J. Nielsen-Gammon,
L.S. Darby, T.B. Ryerson, R.J. Alvarez, S.P. Sandberg, E.J. Williams & M. Trainer, A Bad
Air Day in Houston, BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 657, 658–60 (2005); Lents &
Kelly, supra note 209, at 33.
211. The large population and size of Houston are associated with large numbers of
vehicles and high per capita driving patterns—Houstonians collectively are estimated to
average more than 140 million miles per day. MAYOR’S TASK FORCE ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS
OF AIR POLLUTION, A CLOSER LOOK AT AIR POLLUTION IN HOUSTON: IDENTIFYING PRIORITY
HEALTH RISKS 8–9 (2006), available at http://www.greenhoustontx.gov/reports/UTreport.pdf.

316

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:273

one hundred census tracts (ranked forty) with the highest percentage of cancer risks
attributable to industrial sources.212 The pattern is bolstered further by the number
of census tracts and counties, largely in rural areas or encompassing small cities, in
which the risks from point sources were greater than those in Houston.
Together the preceding analyses reveal several general patterns in industrial
emissions of air toxics. While industrial emissions are minor contributors to
emissions of and risks from air toxics in most jurisdictions, they are much more
likely to account for a significant fraction of toxic emissions in rural or small, urban
environments. The jurisdictions with the highest relative impacts from industrial
emissions are also surprisingly uniform—most of the cancer risks are from highly
toxic compounds emitted by steel plants. The strength of these patterns ought to
make it straightforward to identify industrial hotspots and their small numbers
ought to simplify oversight and monitoring.
IV. REASSESSING THE DEBATE OVER POLLUTION TRADING PROGRAMS AND TOXICS
HOTSPOTS
The EPA data provide a global picture of the major sources of air toxics and
their geographic distribution. The small relative contributions of industrial facilities
and dominance of nonpoint and mobile sources are evident in all of the empirical
studies. These patterns recur whether one evaluates source contributions in terms of
emissions levels or cancer risks, and they persist at geographic scales ranging from
census tracts to the nation as a whole.
The geographic clustering of major industrial sources in the southeast and a few
midwestern and northeastern states is also clearly evident in the emissions and risk
data. The degree to which industrial sources of air toxics are concentrated in
discrete areas is a striking result, but the number of facilities along the Gulf coast in
Texas and Louisiana is truly exceptional. Yet, even in these areas mobile and
nonpoint sources largely dominate. The Houston data are exemplary in this
respect—nonpoint and mobile sources are dominant in the largest industrial hotspot
nationally. This extreme result highlights the degree to which toxic air pollution is
a collective problem for which we are all responsible.
An important implication of these findings is that toxic air pollution generated
by many small sources may be less likely to concentrate in certain neighborhoods.
Localized concentrations of small sources (such as congested highways), however,
can be and are associated with urban hotspots.213 Further, while disparities do and
will continue to exist, the data suggest that the contributing sources will vary
substantially by jurisdiction. Above all, the EPA data show that reductions in
emissions from small businesses, the transportation sector, and the public will be
critical to lowering levels of toxic air pollutants, which by any measure remain high
in urban areas where more than eighty percent of the U.S. population lives.214

212. The highest cancer risk census tracts were localized around the intensely
industrialized area around the ship channel, particularly the East Houston, Channel View,
and San Jacinto neighborhoods.
213. See supra notes 19 & 42.
214. PAUL MACKUN & STEVEN WILSON, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000
TO 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
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The sections that follow address the regulatory and policy implications of the
preceding analysis for GHG trading regimes. Subparts A and B examine the
potential for GHG trading regimes to create or exacerbate toxic hotspots around
industrial sources under the California climate change legislation and an anticipated
national program in the future. Subpart C discusses the legal mechanisms available
to eliminate the potential for GHG trading-induced hotspots to occur, as well as any
associated environmental inequities.
A. Reevaluating Environmental Justice Objections to the GHG Trading System
Proposed in California
A GHG trading regime will not cause significant inequities in exposures to air
toxics unless certain factors align. Beyond facility owners choosing to purchase
permits over reducing GHG emissions, three primary conditions must be met: (1)
industrial facilities must be concentrated in poor communities of color, (2)
industrial sources of GHG emissions must account for a significant fraction of
aggregate toxic air emissions, and (3) emissions of toxic co-pollutants must be
correlated with GHG emissions. If these conditions are met, a GHG trading regime
could allow industrial emissions of toxic co-pollutants to remain roughly the same
in minority communities while emissions decline elsewhere. Under these
circumstances, the net effect of the regulatory flexibility afforded by a GHG trading
program could heighten environmental inequities between poor communities of
color and other neighborhoods.
The critical factors for California’s GHG trading system are the geographic
distribution of industrial sources and their relative contributions to cancer risks
from air toxics. The studies discussed in Part I found that industrial sources of air
toxics were more likely to be located in minority communities and that they
disproportionately impacted them. A 2006 estimate found that, on average, racial
disparities from exposures to industrial emissions of air toxics were about fifteen
percent.215
Measures of racial disparities from industrial facilities alone omit the impacts
from mobile and non-point sources of toxic air pollutants. On average, industrial
sources accounted for about thirteen percent of the NATA Toxics emitted statewide
in 2005 and for about two percent of the cumulative cancer risks. Furthermore,
industrial sources typically had a modest impact on levels of air toxics even in the
most industrialized counties and census tracts.216 For the state as a whole, the
extreme scenario of a twenty percent disparity from industrial sources (i.e., no

01.pdf (stating that almost eighty-four percent of the U.S. population lives in urban
metropolitan areas).
215. ASH ET AL., supra note 67, at 6.
216. In all but a handful of census tracts, industrial emissions accounted for less than
fifteen percent of the cumulative cancer risks from air toxics, and in no case more than
twenty percent. Industry generated less than ten percent of NATA Toxics emitted in all but
one county in California. For example, Contra Costa County has a significant number of the
largest industrial sources of toxic emissions, including petroleum refineries, and industrial
sources accounted for fifteen percent of toxic emissions countywide.
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direct GHG reductions occurring in minority communities) would translate to
roughly a 0.4% disparity in cancer risks for all sources of air toxics.217
These figures represent upper bounds on the relative impacts of industrial
sources in California. EPA’s NATA does not include cancer risks from diesel PM,
which in many urban areas is the single largest source of cancer risk. For example,
in Los Angeles, which contains a large number of both mobile and stationary
sources, mobile sources accounted for ninety-four percent of the 1200 per million
average cancer risk in 2005.218 This estimate is more than ten times higher than the
109 per million cancer risk reported in the 2005 NATA for Los Angeles County.
The divergence between the two estimates is explained almost entirely by the
absence of diesel PM in the NATA estimates,219 which on average accounted for
eighty-four percent of the cancer risk from air toxics in the Los Angeles air
basin.220
Diesel PM is generated overwhelmingly by mobile sources, a fact reflected in
the statistic that stationary sources (non-point and industrial sources) on average
accounted for six percent of the cancer risks from air toxics in Los Angeles.221 The
more complete data suggest that industrial sources in metropolitan areas—where
the largest industrial sources are located in California—are likely to account for
less than two percent of the cancer risks from air toxics at either the county or
census tract level. This evidence is bolstered by estimates of the cancer risks from
individual industrial facilities in California, which in all but a handful of cases were
below ten per million.222
The small contributions of industrial facilities to aggregate emissions of air
toxics limits their capacity to cause significant racial disparities at the census tract
and county levels. The reasoning is simple: if industrial sources account for roughly
ten percent of emissions, racial disparities from industrial sources would on
average be diluted at least twentyfold. Moreover, this analysis assumes that
emissions of air toxics and GHGs would decline at the same rate, which is an
absolute upper bound on the association between GHG and air toxics emissions.223
Direct estimates of correlations between GHGs and toxic air emissions do not
exist to my knowledge. The TRI data on toxic air emissions do, however, provide
separate values for stack and fugitive emissions (e.g., from storage tanks, pipes,
values), which can serve as a rough proxy for emissions that are unlikely to be
correlated with GHG emissions. Fugitive emissions from petroleum refineries,
which in California have the greatest potential to impact minority communities, on

217. This is consistent with California’s twenty percent target for reductions in GHG
emissions by 2020. See supra note 20.
218. MATES III, supra note 19, at ES-2 to ES-3.
219. EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS, supra note 145.
220. MATES III, supra note 19, at ES-2 to ES-3.
221. Id.
222. The data are available through a database maintained by the California Air Resources
Board
(CARB).
See
CARB,
Facility
Search
Engine,
CA.GOV,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/app/emsinv/facinfo/facinfo.php. The cancer risk estimates for petroleum
refineries in California ranged from roughly 2.7 to 9.6 per million, which was more than two
orders of magnitude lower than the average cancer risk in the Los Angeles air basin. Id.
223. See infra Part IV.B.
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average accounted for about forty-nine percent of the OSHA Carcinogens they
emitted. While this is an admittedly crude proxy, it suggests that percentage
reductions in GHG emissions are likely to be associated with substantially smaller
percentage reductions—close to a factor of two—in emissions of air toxics.
The demographic data provided in Minding the Climate Gap enable a more
refined analysis of the potential impacts from industrial facilities on minority
communities.224 Recall that the Minding the Climate Gap report evaluated the
potential impacts of reducing GHG emissions from about 150 of the largest GHG
sources in California. One of the report’s most significant results was that the
projected racial disparities were driven almost entirely by a subset of ten major
facilities, most of which were oil refineries located in Los Angeles and the San
Francisco Bay Area.225 The emissions from these facilities consequently encompass
most of the potential for environmental disparities to arise under a GHG trading
system.
Using the EPA emissions data, it is possible to calculate the share of outdoor
toxic air emissions for each county in which the top ten MCG facilities are located,
as well as their share of the cumulative cancer risks at the county and census-tract
levels. The top ten Minding the Climate Gap facilities accounted for less than five
percent of county-level emissions of NATA Toxics and less than twenty percent of
PM emissions (excluding diesel PM).226 The estimated cancer risks from these
facilities, which ranged from 2.7 to 9.6 per million, were no more than one percent
of the average cumulative cancer risk of 951 per million in Los Angeles.227 Under
plausible scenarios for the near-term, given the twenty percent reduction target for
GHG emissions, industrial emissions appear to be too low for a GHG trading
regime to cause material disparities in aggregate toxic air emissions at the county or
census tract levels.
The EPA air toxics data suggest strongly that a GHG trading regime would not
increase disparities in exposures to toxic emissions in California and that the
potential for racial or income-based inequities is equally slight. The small relative
contributions of industrial sources to aggregate levels of air toxics throughout
California are central to this conclusion. Confidence in these findings is bolstered
by their focus on relative impacts across different source categories, as these
comparisons avoid the large uncertainties associated with direct estimates of risk
and are believed to be among the robust uses of the EPA data.228

224. See infra Part IV.B.
225. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 73, at 18–19 (eight refineries accounted for ninety-three
percent of the inequities in the pollution burden from PM emissions).
226. In Los Angeles County, petroleum refineries accounted for about 0.33% of the
NATA Toxics emitted in 2005 and about five percent of the nondiesel PM; in the Contra
Costa County (the county in the Bay Area where most of the petroleum refineries are
located), they accounted for about four percent of the NATA Toxics emitted and eighteen
percent of the nondiesel PM.
227. MATES III, supra note 19, at ES-2 (these estimates include the cancer risk
associated with diesel PM and are thus substantially higher than the 2005 NATA estimates
for Los Angeles).
228. See, e.g., David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution for
Environmental Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 122–24 (2005).
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B. Likelihood of a National GHG Trading Program Exacerbating Industrial
Hotspots
Unlike California, jurisdictions elsewhere in the country do exist in which
industrial sources account for a large fraction of total toxic air emissions, cancer
risks, or both. The potential for disparate impacts in these jurisdictions cannot be
foreclosed. While unnecessary due to the low industrial emissions in California,
this broader analysis must assess the likelihood that such facilities will rely
disproportionately on purchasing permits (over reducing GHG emissions) and the
degree to which GHG emissions are correlated with toxic emissions.
For purposes of this discussion, I will define “industrial hotspot” using separate
metrics for counties and census tracts to account for the much larger areas over
which emissions are averaged in the county-level data. For counties, the only
requirement is that the cancer risks from industrial facilities exceed ten per million;
for census tracts, industrial emissions must produce cancer risks of at least twenty
per million and account for a minimum of thirty percent of the cumulative cancer
risk across a given tract.229 The latter cancer risk cutoff is intended to be
conservative—it is a factor of twenty above EPA’s target risk level and a factor of
five below the cancer risk EPA deems to be clearly unacceptable;230 it is also less
than half of the fifty-per-million national average for cancer risks from air toxics.231
1. The Infrequency of Industrial Hotspots Nationally
Twelve counties and 240 census tracts nationally satisfy my definition of an
industrial hotspot. Somewhat surprisingly, none of the counties is in either Texas or
Louisiana, which are the two states most commonly associated with toxic
emissions from large industrial facilities. They are instead spread over ten states
and encompass just four cities with populations greater than two hundred thousand
(only one of which, Pittsburgh, is over one million). Within this group, industrial
sources accounted for more than fifty percent of the cumulative cancer risks in only
one county and for more than thirty percent in just half of them; the average for all
twelve counties was thirty-one percent.
The 240 census tracts with industrial hotspots were spread across seventy-three
counties located in twenty-six states, but were most prevalent in Pennsylvania
(seventy-one), Ohio (twenty-five), Indiana (twenty-three), Kansas (fifteen), Texas

229. Among the census tracts in which point sources produced cancer risks greater than
twenty per million but accounted for less than thirty percent of the cumulative risk, the
average point-source cancer risk was twenty-four per million and the maximum was thirtyeight per million (five tracts exceeded thirty per million).
230. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. In California, regulatory action is also
triggered when a facility’s cancer risk exceeds ten per million. S. COAST AIR QUALITY
MGMT. DIST., ANNUAL REPORT ON AB 2588 AIR TOXICS “HOT SPOTS” PROGRAM 2–3 (2011)
available at http://www.aqmd.gov/prdas/ab2588/pdf/Annual_Report_2010.pdf.
231. EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS, supra note 145, at 5. This definition provides a rough
margin of error beyond the putative factor-of-two uncertainty in EPA’s risk estimates, as the
cancer risks from industrial sources not located in hotspots would still fall substantially
below the national average if EPA’s estimates were off by a factor of two.
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(fifteen), and Alabama (thirteen). Industrial hotspots were closely associated with
steel mills and foundries, about 200 tracts or eighty percent of the total; the primary
pollutants were chromium (ninety-nine tracts) or coke oven emissions (ninety-six
tracts).232 Among the sixty-five census tracts in which point sources accounted for
more than half of the cumulative cancer risk, only one in Houston, Texas, and
another in Lincoln, Nebraska, were associated with other types of emissions.233
Further, all but the census tracts in Pittsburgh, Birmingham, and Houston, which
each were outliers with respect to the volume or toxicity of their industrial
emissions,234 were located in rural communities or midsized cities with low
population densities.
Industrial hotspots were closely associated with highly toxic industrial emissions
and low—relative to major urban areas—emissions from mobile and nonpoint
sources. Industrial sources rarely dominated emissions from the other source
categories apart from these exceptional circumstances. Setting aside the distinctive
conditions in Birmingham, Houston, and Pittsburgh, this phenomenon effectively
forecloses industrial hotspots in large urban areas.
The demographics of the census tracts with industrial hotspots are notable
because they were bimodal. This pattern follows from the split between the
geographic centers for steel production in the southern states and those in and
around Pittsburg. In 2005, the demographics of communities with steel mills were
on average twenty-four percent minority, whereas the percentage for iron and steel
foundries was forty-one percent; both were located in communities in which
seventeen percent of the population was low-income.235 By comparison, minorities
made up thirty-two percent of the U.S. population and low-income individuals
accounted for thirteen percent.236 Minorities were thus overrepresented in
communities with iron and steel foundries but underrepresented in communities
with steel mills, whereas the low-income percentages were close to the national
averages in both cases.237
The disparities for minority populations living around steel mills and foundries
cut both ways.238 If an average is calculated for steel mills and foundries

232. Both chromium and coke oven emissions have high relative toxicities. Adel M.
Zayed & Norman Terry, Chromium in the Environment: Factors Affecting Biological
Remediation, 249 PLANT & SOIL 139, 141 (2003) (describing chromium VI as an “extremely
toxic” compound).
233. In Houston, it was benzene and butadiene from refineries and chemical plants, but
in Lincoln it was naphthalene from commercial boilers. The 2005 NATA data do not
identify the chemical compounds responsible for the high risks from industrial sources in the
other seven census tracts.
234. Houston was an outlier as we have seen with regard to the volume of its industrial
emissions; Pittsburgh and Birmingham were outliers with respect to the toxicity of emissions
from local steel mills and foundries.
235. ASH ET AL., supra note 67, at 6–8.
236. Id.
237. Although the study does not provide this number explicitly, the minority average
for all industries was approximately fifteen percent. See id.
238. Basic statistics tells us that the variance in racial composition will increase as the
geographic scale is decreased. Accordingly, the observed siting patterns could be consistent
with a random distribution of facilities.
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collectively, the value for the minority share of toxic exposures is thirty-two
percent,239 which is identical to the minority share of the population nationally. If
the results are disaggregated, however, one could conclude that iron and steel
foundries disproportionately impact minority communities. In the analysis below I
evaluate them together, but the data can be presented in a variety of ways so long as
one is clear about the rationale for their approach.
However one aggregates the data, they suggest that the potential is low for a
national GHG trading program to cause racial or income-based inequities in
exposures from air toxics and that if hotspots were to materialize they would be
limited to a small number of counties and census tracts. The data also show that
large populations and high population densities all but foreclose the emergence of
industrial hotspots in metropolitan areas where the cancer risks from air toxics are
typically the highest.
2. Evaluating the Heightened Risk of Inequities in Industrial Hotspots
Conditions across the country are more variable than those in California with
respect to local demographics and the impacts of toxic emissions from industrial
facilities. Nevertheless, the racial disparities nationally attributable to industrial
emissions of air toxics, about three percent for all industries, were lower than for
California according to Justice in the Air.240 This is to be expected given the much
larger geographic area over which inequities are being averaged, but the countrywide average reinforces other indications that a national GHG trading program is
unlikely to cause systematic racial inequities.
This national average obscures local variations in toxic air emissions. Among
the sixty-five census tracts with the highest relative risks from air toxics, industry
accounted on average for sixty percent of the cumulative cancer risks. In these
tracts, disparities in industrial emissions would be discounted forty percent on
average, rather than the factor of ten typical in California. As a consequence, racial
disparities would be much less likely to be obscured by emissions from other
sources. Further, the high proportion of emissions from industrial sources elevates
the significance of errors in EPA risk estimates as they too are less likely to be
obscured.241 These factors lead to a straightforward inference: GHG tradinginduced hotspots will occur, if at all, in jurisdictions defined here as industrial
hotspots.

239. I calculated a weighted average of the two numbers using the toxic scores for
“Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, Rolling and Finishing Mill” (SIC code 331)—toxic score of
1054, and “Iron and Steel Foundries” (SIC code 332)—toxic score of 939. ASH ET AL., supra
note 67, at 6–8.
240. Id. at 10–11 (disclosing that the share of health impacts from emissions for air
toxics by all industrial sectors was 34.8% compared to their 31.8% share of the population).
Table 3 discloses that the racial share for the ten industrial sectors with the highest levels of
inequities was 37.3, which leads to a disparity on average of 5.5%. Id. In this discussion, I
will focus on racial inequities given the weak evidence for income disparities discussed in
Part I.
241. See supra notes 121–25.
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The analysis is simplified by the modest number of industrial hotspots
nationally, 240 census tracts in all, and the small number of industries implicated.
As noted above, steel mills and foundries were associated with eighty percent of
the industrial hotspots at the census-tract level, the most notable exception being
the Houston petrochemical complex.242 Refineries and steel plants also have among
the highest GHG emissions of any industrial sector,243 and because of this would be
an important (and early) target for any national GHG trading system.244
The presence of an industrial hotspot does not automatically lead to racial
inequities. The demographics of the communities surrounding a facility may or
may not be disproportionately minority groups. In the present context, the racial
demographics around petroleum refineries were extreme (fifty percent minority),245
while the demographics around steel production facilities as noted above were
mixed.246 One’s view of potential disparities in risk exposures will rest on how the
data are aggregated. If the impacts of steel mills and foundries on surrounding
populations are evaluated together, the minority share of the risks from exposures
to their emissions would match the minority share of the U.S. population and thus
preclude racial inequities.247
The central question being addressed here is whether a national GHG trading
program would cause or exacerbate racial disparities in exposures to toxic air
pollutants. The natural geographic scale on which to evaluate such inequities is
therefore the national level. The data from Justice in the Air also can be used to
derive the minority share of the risks (cancer and noncancer) from industrial
hotspots nationally. Since petroleum refineries and steel production facilities
account for most of the industrial hotspots in the United States, I will use a

242. The number of industrial hotspots may be declining as a consequence of more
stringent standards for steel mills and foundries that EPA issued in 2005 and 2007. See, e.g.,
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Iron and Steel Foundries, 73
Fed. Reg. 7210 (Feb. 7, 2008) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63); National Emission Standards
for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Coke Ovens: Pushing, Quenching, and Battery Stacks, 70
Fed. Reg. 44,285 (Aug. 2, 2005) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). Emissions of chromium
compounds from steel plants in Alabama, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (the states with
the bulk of the industrial hotspots), collectively declined fifty percent between 2005 and
2010.
243. See EPA, supra note 172, at ES-5 (disclosing that steel production was ranked
second only to electric utilities and that petroleum production was ranked twelfth among all
sources and second among industrial sources).
244. They are already being targeted under EPA’s new GHG regulations under the Clean Air
Act. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.); EPA, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS TO ADDRESS
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS AND REFINERIES: FACT SHEET 1–
2 (2010), available at http://epa.gov/carbonpollutionstandard/pdfs/settlementfactsheet.pdf.
245. ASH ET AL., supra note 67, at 14. The racial demographics around the Exxon
Baytown Refinery in Houston were slightly higher, fifty-four percent minority. Id. at 12.
246. Id. at 10.
247. The minority share for steel mills and iron and steel foundries was twenty-four and
forty-one percent, respectively. Id. If the two numbers are averaged by weighting them
according to their respective toxic score, collectively the minority share is thirty-two percent,
which is essentially identical to the minority share of the U.S. population. See id. at 10–11.
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weighted average of the human health risks for these industries. The minority share
of the health risks in 2006 was 33.3 percent for these industries, which represents a
racial disparity of 1.5 percent.248 The roughly proportional racial demographics of
industrial hotspots effectively preclude a national GHG trading program from
causing racial disparities.
As a practical matter, disagreements about the geographic area over which
inequities are evaluated are probably secondary. Other factors are likely to preclude
a national GHG trading program from exacerbating environmental inequities. First,
similar to California, the targets for reducing GHG emissions are likely to be
modest in the near term (about twenty percent over the first decade or so).249
Reduction targets for GHG emissions create an absolute upper bound on the
potential disparities of industrial emissions, which are then discounted forty percent
to account for the average relative contributions of industrial sources in hotspots.
This results in an upper bound for racial disparities among the highest risk
jurisdiction of twelve percent or, in absolute terms, an increase in cancer risk on
average of approximately eight per million for the top sixty-five census tracts or
three per million for all industrial hotspots.250
Second, a GHG trading program would operate in parallel with existing
regulations under the CAA, which impose technology-based and residual-risk
standards on industrial sources of air toxics.251 These regulatory programs establish
basic limits on emissions from petroleum refineries and steel production facilities,
and thus would bound the impacts of GHG trading on emissions of toxic copollutants and potential disparities between jurisdictions. This would not eliminate
disparities, but recent declines in emissions—including those from steel plants—
suggest that they could be substantially dampened.252
Third, disparities will be limited because the techniques used to reduce GHG
emissions often will not affect emissions of air toxics. In some cases, toxic
emissions will not be associated with the processes (mostly combustion) that
generate GHG emissions.253 Indeed, a significant fraction of the GHG emissions

248. See id. (the minority share of the U.S. population was 31.8 percent). This estimate
is averaged over all petroleum refineries, even though Houston is the only jurisdiction in
which petroleum refineries were associated with an industrial hotspot. This weighted the
result towards the higher racial disparities found around refineries.
249. The target in California is a twenty percent reduction in GHG emissions below
1990 levels by 2020. See supra note 20. The failed congressional climate change legislation,
the American Clean Energy and Security Act, contained a weaker target of seventeen percent
below 2005 GHG emissions levels by 2020; its long-term target was an eighty-three percent
reduction below 2005 by 2050. John M. Broder, Ambitious Energy and Climate Bill Clears a
House Hurdle, But Others Remain, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2009, at A13.
250. These estimates are based on the average cancer risks associated with industrial
sources in industrial hotspots; I have simply multiplied the average cancer risk by percentage
disparity.
251. DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 175, at 611–19.
252. See ASH ET AL., supra note 67 at 10–12.
253. This is true for both steel plants and petroleum refineries. See EPA, AVAILABLE
AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM THE IRON
AND STEEL INDUSTRY 3 (2010) [hereinafter EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES STEEL]; EPA,
AVAILABLE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
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attributable to steel production derive from offsite electric power production,254
which is by definition spatially separated and decoupled from onsite toxics
emissions. Similarly, use of energy-efficient measures to reduce GHG emissions
from combustion processes will often impact only a portion of the emissions at a
facility. Many fugitive emissions, as described above, are not caused by
combustion processes and on average they accounted for more than forty percent of
the toxic emissions at steel plants and petroleum refineries in 2010.255
Fourth, exploiting opportunities for increasing the energy efficiency of industrial
operations is a, if not the, primary means by which GHG emissions are likely to be
reduced over the near term.256 The EPA believes that this may be especially true in
energy-intensive sectors, such as the steel and petroleum industries, where most
GHG emissions are generated by onsite combustion of fossil fuels or offsite
generation of electricity.257
The favorable economics suggest that steel and petroleum industries will often
choose to reduce GHG emissions over purchasing credits.258 The EPA has
identified numerous options for reducing GHG emissions with payback periods of
less than five years.259 This situation differs radically from other areas where the
only options for reducing emissions are fuel switching or costly emissions-control
technologies.260 The option of enhancing energy efficiency creates a choice
between making annual payments for GHG credits and investing in cost-benefit
PETROLEUM REFINING INDUSTRY 3 (2010) [hereinafter EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
REFINERIES].
254. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES STEEL, supra note 253, at 1.
255. On average, fugitive emissions in 2010 accounted for about forty percent of OSHA
Carcinogens from steel plants in states with industrial hotspots (the range was roughly from
about twenty to sixty percent). For the petroleum refineries in Houston, fugitive emissions in
2010 on average also accounted for about forty percent of OSHA Carcinogens emitted (the
range was roughly from fifteen to sixty-five percent).
256. EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES STEEL, supra note 253, at 9–12 (focusing almost
exclusively on energy efficiency measures to reduce GHG emissions including tables
detailing the options); EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES REFINERIES, supra note 253, at 4 (stating
that “a primary option to reduce CO2 emissions is to improve energy efficiency” at
petroleum refineries).
257. In the steel industry, direct combustion and electricity generation account for about
eighty-five to ninety percent of the industry’s GHG emissions. See EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES STEEL, supra note 253, at 3. Combustion sources alone account for sixtythree percent of GHG emissions at oil refineries; this rises to eighty-seven percent if catalytic
regeneration processes, which also involve combustion, are included. EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES REFINERIES, supra note 253, at 3.
258. In other pollution trading programs, the larger and dirtier facilities have often
reduced their emissions the most dramatically. DALLAS BURTRAW & SARAH JO SZAMBELAN,
U.S. EMISSIONS TRADING MARKETS FOR SO2 AND NOX 8 (2009) (describing studies showing
that under the U.S. SO2 trading market, “[t]he greatest reductions in emissions by far (in
tonnage and percentage) were in the Midwest, the area with the greatest power plant
emissions historically”), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-0940.pdf.
259. See EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES REFINERIES, supra note 253, at 11–16; EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES STEEL, supra note 253, at 9–12.
260. BURTRAW & SZAMBELAN, supra note 258, at 11–14 (discussing the fuel-switching
and emissions controls available under the SO2 trading program).
FROM THE
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justified technologies with substantial short- and long-term benefits. If capital costs
are reasonable, as the EPA projects in many cases, facility owners ought to have a
significant incentive to reduce GHG emissions,261 and inequities would not arise
because purchasing GHG credits would not be preferred over reducing GHG
emissions.
The availability of cost-effective options for reducing GHG emissions could, of
course, change as the cap on GHG emissions is reduced over time. The impact of
more stringent caps on pollution trading and technological options is difficult to
predict. Some emerging technologies for reducing GHG emissions could reduce
toxic emissions dramatically,262 but the economics of new technologies and their
effects on co-pollutants will clearly vary across industries and by technology. New
technologies could also be used to mitigate the emergence of hotspots by enabling
more effective oversight of a GHG trading program, such as through new
technologies that enhance the accuracy and reduce the costs of emissions
monitoring. These uncertainties are substantial and are grounds for caution going
forward, but they may not be a major factor in the near term given the emphasis on
energy efficiency.
Taken together the EPA data and existing scientific studies reveal that a national
GHG trading regime would not exacerbate environmental inequities in most
counties and census tracts. Similar to California, the small contributions of
industrial facilities to aggregate emissions of air toxics would in most cases
effectively foreclose such inequities. Of equal importance, among the census tracts
in which industrial emissions dominate, the local demographics mirror those of the
country as a whole and thus could not cause significant racial inequities in
aggregate.
Regardless of how the racial issues are evaluated, the potential for a national
GHG trading program to exacerbate disparities in the emissions of air toxics
between industrial hotspots and other jurisdictions cannot be ignored. In the near
term, the modest targets anticipated for a national GHG trading regime would limit
the magnitude of any potential disparities, and this backstop would be reinforced by
direct regulation of toxic emissions under the CAA. These limits are in turn likely
to be augmented by the weak correlation between GHG and toxic emissions and
favorable economics for reducing GHG emissions.

261. Other reasons may exist that override the favorable economics—perhaps the ones
keeping companies from investing in energy efficiency now—but a GHG trading regime
would make energy-efficiency options more attractive and potentially cheaper if new
technologies are developed or new knowledge enhances the effectiveness of existing ones or
reduces their costs. Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, A Tale of Two
Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165–66
(2005) (describing how environmental regulations, including pollution trading, can stimulate
technological innovation and adoption, but also detailing other market failures that can
create barriers to innovation). EPA technical reports suggest that a wide range of options are
potentially available. See EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES REFINERIES, supra note 253, at 11–16;
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES STEEL, supra note 253, at 9–12.
262. See, e.g., EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES STEEL, supra note 253, at 40 (describing an
emerging technology that would reduce emissions from iron and steel foundries—volatile
organic compounds by eighty-seven percent and mercury by fifty-eight percent).
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It is my hope that the EPA data and preceding analysis will assuage concerns
that toxic hotspots will be an unavoidable and substantial byproduct of
implementing a national GHG trading regime. More broadly, I hope that this work
will lower health-equity concerns about market-based regulations generally—
including taxes. In the long term, conditions will change and emissions caps will be
lowered, either of which could introduce new factors that qualify my analysis. For
these and other reasons, the public is likely to demand that additional measures be
taken to ensure that communities located in industrial hotspots are adequately
protected.
3. Preventing Inequities Without Sacrificing the Efficiency of a National GHG
Trading Regime
The preceding analysis has shown that inequities cannot be foreclosed in
jurisdictions for which industrial sources contribute significantly to toxic
emissions. Further, risk estimates in these jurisdictions will be more sensitive to the
acknowledged uncertainties in the EPA data, which could fuel skepticism about the
metrics—particularly cancer risks—upon which the preceding analysis is based.
The remaining uncertainties, as well as the prospect of more aggressive measures in
the future, are likely to prompt calls for additional legal protections to safeguard
potentially vulnerable communities.
Adapting pollution trading regimes to prevent the emergence of toxic hotspots
has been contentious.263 Proponents of market-based regulations worry that
mechanisms for addressing inequities will sacrifice the efficiency of pollution
markets by either increasing the costs of transactions or placing restrictions on the
trades that can occur (for example, geographic limits).264 The debate then becomes
one of balancing the efficiency of pollution markets against distributional concerns
about environmental inequities,265 although few studies have attempted to assess
the potential for pollution trading regimes to generate significant environmental
inequities.266

263. Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 572 (stating the proposals to mitigate hotspots
have had “significant drawbacks, either providing only an incomplete solution to the
problem or introducing complexity that could stand in the way of the efficient functioning of
the market”); Alan J. Krupnick, Wallace E. Oates & Eric Van De Verg, On Marketable AirPollution Permits: The Case for a System of Pollution Offsets, 10 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
233, 242–43 (1983) (discussing the tradeoffs between efficiency and spatial disaggregation
of a market to accommodate geographic and other variables in the area covered by a trading
program).
264. See, e.g., EPA, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A
CAP AND TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 3–22 (2003) (discussing the tradeoffs
between efficiency and distribution concerns).
265. See supra Part I.C.
266. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 73, at 21–22 (finding that a GHG trading program
in California could cause hotspots around certain facilities that result in environmental
inequities); SCHATZKI & STAVINS, supra note 13, at 15–18 (using air pollution data for Los
Angeles to argue that hotspots are unlikely to arise from a GHG trading program in
California); Ringquist, supra note 5, at 301–02, 321–22 (describing the handful of existing
studies that exist; finding a negative correlation between the minority status of local
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The geographically discrete nature of industrial hotspots described above
suggests that a targeted strategy for mitigating potential inequities ought to be
feasible. This approach would have two obvious benefits. First, it would avoid the
added costs of imposing additional measures on the entire system, which for a
national market would be considerable. Second, the small number of jurisdictions
involved would enable refinement of legal mechanisms to the circumstances in
each jurisdiction without greatly impacting the administrative costs of the program.
One can gain a sense of the relative size of the potential impacts on a national
GHG trading system through the inventories of GHG emissions for steel plants and
petroleum refineries. In 2009, the two industries collectively accounted for about
five percent of the GHGs emitted by industrial sources in the United States and less
than one percent of total GHG emissions.267 The percentages for the subset of
facilities located in industrial hotspots would be a fraction of these percentages. At
this scale, market interventions targeted to specific industrial hotspots would not
materially affect the efficiency of a GHG trading program.
I will not attempt to describe the details of how a national GHG trading program
could be modified in this Article. My central point is simply that the tradeoff
between equity and efficiency is largely neutralized by the infrequency of industrial
hotspots nationally. In addition, a large literature exists on modifying pollution
trading regimes to prevent the emergence of toxic hotspots,268 and there is every
reason to believe that these well-developed policies would work well under
circumstances where hotspots are rare. In the analysis that follows, I assume that
targeted policies would apply only to sources with large emissions of both air
toxics and GHGs that are located in jurisdictions with industrial hotspots.269
To illustrate the feasibility of mitigating toxic hotspots, I will briefly describe
three prominent mechanisms for modifying pollution trading regimes in the
literature. The examples are (1) heightened monitoring and informational
requirements for trades, (2) geographic restrictions on trading (often referred to as
communities and the likelihood that a facility would purchase emissions credits in the SO2
trading program).
267. Collectively, steel production facilities accounted for less than one percent of total
U.S. GHG emissions in 2009 and about five percent of industrial emissions of GHGs. EPA,
supra note 172, at ES-5. Petroleum refineries collectively accounted for less than a tenth of a
percent of GHG emissions nationally and less than half a percent of industrial emissions of
GHGs. Id.
268. See, e.g., Chinn, supra note 2, at 115–22; Drury et al., supra note 3, at 284–88; Meredith
Fowlie & Nicholas Muller, Designing Markets for Pollution When Damages Vary Across Sources:
Evidence from the NOx Budget Program 2–4 (U.C. Berkeley & Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
2010), available at http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/seminar/Seminar20111202.pdf; Evan
Goldenberg, The Design of an Emissions Permit Market for RECLAIM: A Holistic Approach, 11
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 297, 313–17 (1993); Johnson, supra note 2, at 147–64; Kaswan,
supra note 2, at 10304–07; Krupnick et al., supra note 263, at 238–42; Nicholas Z. Muller &
Robert Mendelsohn, Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right, 99 AM. ECON. REV.
1714, 1735–37 (2009); Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 572–73; Tom Tietenberg, Tradeable
Permits for Pollution Control When Emission Location Matters: What Have We Learned?, 5
ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 95, 103–10 (1995).
269. The definition of industrial hotspots need not be identical to mine, but it must be
defined in absolute terms (minimum cancer risk) and relative terms (percentage of
cumulative cancer risks attributable to industrial sources).
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“zonal trading”), and (3) pollution offset markets in which sales of credits to
sources located in industrial hotspots would be subjected to a premium (i.e., greater
than a one-to-one ratio of credits to GHG emissions).270 My primary purpose in
discussing them is to highlight the increased efficacy and administrative ease of
implementing them when the number of potential hotspots is small and readily
identifiable. I will briefly describe each of the strategies and then highlight how
they benefit from a targeted approach.
Heightened monitoring and informational requirements could be imposed in a
variety of ways. At minimum, they could involve reporting the increased emissions
of toxic co-pollutants that would be associated with purchasing pollution credits.
As a purely informational approach, this would minimize transaction costs and
could limit them further by using EPA emissions factors to calculate emissions
differentials. More elaborate requirements could include added monitoring
requirements in and around facilities, as well as high-resolution modeling of the
impacts on local pollutant levels and risks. In other words, facilities wishing to
purchase credits could be required to provide high-quality information on the local
impacts of their proposed trades and to make this information available to the
public. These added requirements would increase the effective cost of GHG credits
and potentially lead to public pressure, both of which could reduce the
attractiveness of purchasing GHG emissions credits.
A virtue of an approach that singles out higher-risk facilities is that the
information would be required only where it would be most valuable. Nor would
these requirements lead to an unmanageable amount of new information that could
be difficult for either the EPA or the general public to absorb and utilize
effectively. Imposing elevated standards selectively could also have spillover
benefits. For example, higher-quality information on emissions of air toxics could
be used to improve emissions inventories and risk estimates for facilities elsewhere,
and this in turn could be used to set priorities under the CAA toxics program.
Geographic restrictions on pollution trading have long been discussed as a
strategy for protecting against hotspots under cap-and-trade regulations.271 They
often take the form of strict limits on trades between geographically delimited
zones within a trading area.272 The pollution trading program in southern California
(RECLAIM), for example, has two zones (one coastal and one inland); trades that
could increase pollutant levels in the more-industrialized coastal zone are
banned.273 Numerous variations exist on this basic strategy, including highly
calibrated systems that restrict trades if they could “lead[] to a violation of an
ambient standard at any receptor point.”274 Regardless of the specifics, restrictions
on pollution trading cover specified sources or trades and are designed to prevent
increases in aggregate emissions in a particular geographic zone.

270. See, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 1, at 614–15.
271. See supra note 268.
272. See supra note 268.
273. Specifically, new sources and existing sources seeking to exceed their initial
allocation of emissions can only purchase credits within the coastal zone. Nash & Revesz,
supra note 1, at 611–12.
274. Id. at 624–25.
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The EPA emissions and cancer risk data provide reliable metrics for identifying
the geographic zones (on the order of 240 census tracts in seventy-three counties)
in which trading might be restricted under a national GHG trading system.275
Further, the distinctive characteristics of industrial hotspots ought to simplify
implementation of such restrictions as most of the industrial hotspots in the United
States are caused by a single, or small number of, facilities. They are also located
predominantly in rural areas and small cities, which means that few, if any, other
sources would be affected by targeted restrictions on trading. The most significant
exceptions would be Houston, and to a lesser extent Pittsburg and Birmingham, but
even for large cities precedent exists for pollution trading as demonstrated by Los
Angeles. Concerns about the complexities of implementing trading restriction in
urban settings may be mitigated further by the large scale of a national GHG
trading market.
The third mechanism, pollution offsets, can be structured around specific classes
of facilities or geographic zones. For example, either steel mills alone or all
facilities within a certain radius of a steel mill could be subjected to a premium for
purchasing GHG credits (e.g., required to purchase 1.2 credits for every ton of
GHGs). Furthermore, the tractable numbers could allow offset ratios to vary
according to the risks posed by toxic co-pollutants in the associated jurisdictions.
These measures could be combined with the heightened monitoring requirements
discussed above, each of which would increase the costs of emitting GHGs and
thus enhance incentives to reduce emissions of GHGs and toxic co-pollutants.
The relative ease of implementing a pollution offset program when the number
of facilities or jurisdictions is small mirrors that for the heightened monitoring and
information requirements. When delimited geographically, pollution offsets share
many similarities with zonal programs, with the primary difference being that
premiums are imposed rather than rigid restrictions on trades. For a pollution offset
program, arguably the greatest benefit of the scarcity of potential hotspots is that
the offsets could be set for specific facilities or jurisdictions and be optimized over
time. The limits of administrative capacities for such refinements would be
drastically reduced if the numbers were large.
This brief discussion of legal mechanisms is merely intended to highlight
several of the practical benefits of being able to readily identify and characterize
the small number of industrial hotspots potentially at risk under a national GHG
trading program. The primary virtues are straightforward: addressing potential
inequities would be very unlikely to impact the efficiency of a national GHG
trading market, and the tractable numbers would enable accurate monitoring as well
as optimization of legal mechanisms over time.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents the first synthesis of EPA emissions inventory and cancer
risk data for air toxics in the United States. The data show clearly that vehicles and
small stationary sources emit a majority of the air toxics nationally and account for

275. Recent reductions in toxic emissions from steel plants could cause the number of
industrial hotspots to fall. See supra note 252.
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most of the cancer risks. This basic pattern is replicated at spatial scales ranging
from census tracts to the nation as a whole. It is most pronounced, however, in
large metropolitan areas, which have the lowest air quality and are home to eightypercent of the U.S. population. Industrial facilities account for a higher proportion
of air toxics in rural or small-urban jurisdictions, but this occurs in fewer than 250
census tracts nationally and is closely associated with a handful of industries.
The secondary status of industrial facilities as sources of air toxics largely
neutralizes the potential for GHG trading programs, whether at the state or national
level, to cause toxic hotspots. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, industrial
emissions are simply too low, and in the few jurisdictions in which disparities
cannot be ruled out, targeted policies exist to prevent them without compromising
market efficiency. Further, the racial demographics of the industrial hotspots
identified in the present study mirror those of the country as a whole and thus
would not give rise to significant racial disparities.
Thus, while localized hotspots cannot be ruled out, the likelihood in the near
term of a GHG trading program, whether in California or at the national level,
causing disparities in exposures to toxic co-pollutants is exceedingly low. These
findings are likely to be generalizable to other pollution-trading programs and to
market-based regulations generally.
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APPENDIX A: SELECTING METRICS AND MANAGING UNCERTAINTIES IN EPA’S AIR
TOXICS DATA
This appendix addresses two issues related to the EPA data. In Part A, I examine
questions about choosing a metric to assess environmental inequities, including the
range of sources covered. In Part B, I discuss the uncertainties and potential errors
in EPA’s emissions inventories and their potential impacts on cancer risk estimates.
I will briefly review the technical issues and their implications for my conclusions.
A. Choosing the Right Metric for Studies of Environmental Inequities
The focus of the environmental justice literature on industrial facilities in
isolation was likely driven by the unavailability of other data but has persisted
despite the emergence of major databases for all outdoor sources of air toxics.
Utilization of the different types of data will nevertheless depend on the specific
questions at issue. The various metrics (geographic distribution of sources,
emissions levels, excess cancer risks) used in the studies described in Parts I–III
illustrate this point—each one sheds a unique light on the nature and magnitude of
the harms.
The data also vary with regard to their accuracy and the robustness of the
methods used to generate them, and inevitable tradeoffs will exist in choosing to
rely on one form of data over another. One researcher might, for example, choose a
direct measure of harm in the form of a cumulative risk assessment, whereas
another may favor studies of geographic disparities in the siting of industrial
facilities. The former decision could be motivated by a concern that location alone
does not provide information about risks to human health—at best, it operates as a
loose proxy for inferring harm. The latter decision could be motivated by concern
that cancer risk estimates are based on uncertain estimates of chemical toxicity or
dubious models for projecting the dispersion of chemical toxins in the
atmosphere.276
These tradeoffs involve a challenging mix of quantitative uncertainties and
qualitative judgments. Fortuitously, the tradeoffs between different metrics are less
significant for the present study. One of the more striking aspects of the data on air
toxics is the consistency of the results across different metrics and spatial scales.
The congruence of the empirical studies mitigates the potential for fundamental
points of disagreement.
People may also view the data presented here differently depending on whether
they focus on relative or absolute risk levels, and perspectives may shift according
to the context. Cumulative risks from air toxics in the United States span more than
three orders of magnitude—from below one in a million to above 1000 in a
million.277 This is part of the context relevant to evaluating, for example, a thirty
percent disparity in which white communities experience a cancer risk of twenty

276. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 228, at 122–24; Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad
Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 90 (1988).
277. EPA, SUMMARY OF RESULTS, supra note 145, at 3–4; MATES III, supra note 19, at
ES-2 to ES-3.
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per million while minority communities experience one of twenty-six per million.
In most counties and census tracts the potential disparities will fall far below this,
and where they may not (for example, industrial hotspots), I highlight them. In
doing so, I am seeking to be attentive to concerns about relative and absolute
cancer risks.
B. Accounting for Errors and Uncertainties in EPA’s Emissions Inventories and
Cancer Risk Estimates
For purposes of my argument, the impact of errors in EPA’s emissions
inventories for air toxics will be greatest in jurisdictions in which industrial sources
dominate. The estimate as shown before involves basic discounting: estimates that
are low by a factor of two when industrial sources account for five percent of
aggregate emissions would cause a ten percent change in total emissions, whereas
the same relative error would alter aggregate emissions by fifty percent if industrial
sources accounted for half of total emissions. For this reason, errors in the EPA’s
emissions data for industrial sources will rarely have a material impact on
emissions level or cancer risk estimates at either the census-tract or county level.
The secondary status of industrial emissions in most jurisdictions simplifies my
analysis but does not allow me to ignore the uncertainties in the EPA’s data
altogether. To the contrary, it is precisely those jurisdictions in which industrial
emissions dominate, and thus are at greatest risk of creating hotspots, that the
uncertainties in the EPA’s data must be considered. As described in further detail in
Part III.A and IV.B.1, industrial hotspots are closely associated with steel
production facilities, which are found in multiple jurisdictions, and the highly
industrialized area around the ship channel in Houston, Texas. In both cases,
emissions from industrial sources are significant in relative and absolute terms.
The uncertainties in the EPA’s data cannot be quantified rigorously. Scientists
have directly monitored emissions from major industrial sources, such as oil
refineries, and compared the measured levels to those in the EPA emissions
inventories. Some of these studies suggest that the EPA’s emissions factors could
be low by more than a factor of two and possibly more than a factor of ten in
certain cases.278 These results must be evaluated carefully, though, as they involve
sources for which the errors were anticipated to be the largest.279 The EPA
maintains that for most sources its emissions factors are unlikely to be off by more
than a factor of two.280 On balance, given the small number of industrial sources for
which large errors are suspected, I will use EPA’s factor of two as the upper bound
on potential errors in its data.
If we assume a one-to-one linear relationship between cumulative cancer risk
and the emissions level of an air toxic,281 rough estimates of the impact of revising

278. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text.
281. This assumption mirrors the use of emissions factors by the EPA. See Emissions
Factors & AP 42, Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors, EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/index.html (describing the simple linear formula in which
emissions factors are used).
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the EPA’s emissions factors upwards can be calculated. Under this simplified
approach, a doubling of an EPA emissions factor would double the cancer risks
associated with an industrial source. These estimates represent an upper bound on
the derived cancer risks where EPA emissions factors off by the factor of two are
believed to bound EPA’s estimates.282
This analysis can then be applied to the two classes of jurisdictions subject to
heightened risks from industrial sources. Toxic air emissions from steel mills or
foundries were largely, if not exclusively, responsible for fifty-eight of the sixtyfive census tracts in which industrial emissions were the dominant source of cancer
risks in 2005.283 In these census tracts, steel plants on average accounted for about
sixty percent of the cancer risks from air toxics.284 If EPA emissions factors were
off by a factor of two, the average cumulative cancer risk in these census tracts
would rise from about 112 to 179 per million, which would place most of these
tracts among the top one hundred for cancer risk nationally.285
The contribution to emissions of air toxics from industrial sources in Houston
was more modest. Among the most industrialized census tracts, emissions from
industrial sources on average accounted for thirty-seven percent of cumulative
cancer risks.286 My rough error estimation method predicts that errors in EPA
emissions factors of a factor of two would cause estimates of the cumulative cancer
risk to rise from roughly 150 per million to about 300 per million. This error
correction would cause cumulative cancer risks from air toxics in these census
tracts to be among the very highest in the country.
These calculations demonstrate that errors in EPA’s emissions factors could
have a substantial impact on the estimates of cumulative cancer risks in these
jurisdictions. The errors could both dramatically underestimate the relative impacts
of industrial sources and obscure the potential for a GHG trading regime to cause
hotspots of toxic co-pollutants to arise. The jurisdictions that I have designated as
industrial hotspots consequently have two strikes against them. The high relative
contribution of toxic air emissions from industrial sources makes them both the
most likely sites for GHG-trading-induced hotspots and the most sensitive to
uncertainties in EPA’s emissions and cancer risk data.

282. The approach is conservative to the extent that a one-to-one relationship does not
exist between emissions levels and risk. See Bryan Hubbell, Understanding Urban Exposure
Environments: New Research Directions for Informing Implementation of U.S. Air Quality
Standards, 5 AIR QUALITY ATMOSPHERE & HEALTH 259, 261–62 (2012) (describing the
complexities of air toxic exposures in an urban setting); Ariel F. Stein, Vlad Isakov, James
Godowitch & Roland R. Draxler, A Hybrid Modeling Approach to Resolve Pollutant
Concentrations in an Urban Area, 41 ATMOSPHERIC ENV’T 9410, 9413–14 (2007).
283. See supra Part IV.B.1.
284. See supra Part IV.B.1.
285. The two census tracts, one in Allegheny, Pennsylvania, and the other in Brooke,
West Virginia, were ranked first and fifth with respect to the cumulative risks from air
toxics.
286. Point sources accounted for thirty to sixty-four percent of the cumulative risks
from air toxics in these tracts.
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL FIGURES BASED ON THE EPA’S 2005 NEI DATABASE

Emissions of NATA Toxics from Major Point Sources
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State PM2.5 Emissions from Major Point Sources
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Emissions of SO2 in the Top States
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